Investor-state disputes and the TTIP – is it a new challenge for corporate responsibility?
In the broad context of responsible management, and corporate responsibility, the present paper studies the general issue of conflicts between private investors, and governments, with a particular focus on the investor-state dispute settlement through international arbitration. On the grounds of empirical research published by other scholars, particularly by Susan D. Franck, and Barbara Koremenos, the paper aims at explaining theoretically the underlying economic motives of the recent surge in the number of internationally arbitrated, investor-state disputes, and at predicting its future developments. Additionally, the theoretical findings are applied to evaluate some of the possible, institutional outcomes of the prospective Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. The general conclusion is that not only isn’t the international arbitration of investor-state disputes a threat to democracy, but also said arbitration helps to redress past infringements to public sovereignty.
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- Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
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- Koremenos, Barbara & Snidal, Duncan, 2003. "Moving Forward, One Step at a Time," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 57(02), pages 431-444, March.
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