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Investor-state disputes and the TTIP – is it a new challenge for corporate responsibility?


  • Waśniewski, Krzysztof


In the broad context of responsible management, and corporate responsibility, the present paper studies the general issue of conflicts between private investors, and governments, with a particular focus on the investor-state dispute settlement through international arbitration. On the grounds of empirical research published by other scholars, particularly by Susan D. Franck, and Barbara Koremenos, the paper aims at explaining theoretically the underlying economic motives of the recent surge in the number of internationally arbitrated, investor-state disputes, and at predicting its future developments. Additionally, the theoretical findings are applied to evaluate some of the possible, institutional outcomes of the prospective Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. The general conclusion is that not only isn’t the international arbitration of investor-state disputes a threat to democracy, but also said arbitration helps to redress past infringements to public sovereignty.

Suggested Citation

  • Waśniewski, Krzysztof, 2014. "Investor-state disputes and the TTIP – is it a new challenge for corporate responsibility?," MPRA Paper 57346, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:57346

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    2. Barbara Koremenos, 2007. "If Only Half of International Agreements Have Dispute Resolution Provisions, Which Half Needs Explaining?," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 36(1), pages 189-212, January.
    3. Ross, Stephen A, 1973. "The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 63(2), pages 134-139, May.
    4. Marvin Berhold, 1971. "A Theory of Linear Profit-Sharing Incentives," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 85(3), pages 460-482.
    5. Fama, Eugene F & Jensen, Michael C, 1983. "Separation of Ownership and Control," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 301-325, June.
    6. Koremenos, Barbara & Lipson, Charles & Snidal, Duncan, 2001. "The Rational Design of International Institutions," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 55(04), pages 761-799, September.
    7. Koremenos, Barbara & Snidal, Duncan, 2003. "Moving Forward, One Step at a Time," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 57(02), pages 431-444, March.
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    More about this item


    corporate responsibility; public sovereignty; institutions; investor-state disputes;

    JEL classification:

    • F5 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy
    • F6 - International Economics - - Economic Impacts of Globalization
    • H1 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • K0 - Law and Economics - - General

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