IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/ucp/jlstud/v36y2007p189-212.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

If Only Half of International Agreements Have Dispute Resolution Provisions, Which Half Needs Explaining?

Author

Listed:
  • Barbara Koremenos

Abstract

An examination of a random sample of international agreements that are conditional on four issue areas shows that only about one out of every two agreements has any dispute resolution provision. This observation begs for an explanation, and which half needs explaining depends on where one is sitting. Do power politics dominate international law, or does the law provide a fundamental order? Employing a rational choice framework, I focus on a set of independent variables that capture the cooperation problem being addressed by members to an agreement and put forth conjectures explaining the inclusion of dispute resolution provisions. Using newly collected data, I find that agreements that address complex cooperation problems, that is, problems characterized by uncertainty, prisoner's dilemma–like incentives to defect, and/or time inconsistency, are more likely to include such provisions. I therefore suggest that international law is quite efficient, with states not creating and/or delegating dispute resolution authority when it is unlikely to be needed.

Suggested Citation

  • Barbara Koremenos, 2007. "If Only Half of International Agreements Have Dispute Resolution Provisions, Which Half Needs Explaining?," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 36(1), pages 189-212, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlstud:v:36:y:2007:p:189-212
    DOI: 10.1086/509275
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/509275
    Download Restriction: Access to the online full text or PDF requires a subscription.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Abbott, Kenneth W. & Keohane, Robert O. & Moravcsik, Andrew & Slaughter, Anne-Marie & Snidal, Duncan, 2000. "The Concept of Legalization," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 54(03), pages 401-419, June.
    2. Schwartz, Warren F & Sykes, Alan O, 2002. "The Economic Structure of Renegotiation and Dispute Resolution in the World Trade Organization," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 31(1), pages 179-204, January.
    3. Koremenos, Barbara & Lipson, Charles & Snidal, Duncan, 2001. "The Rational Design of International Institutions," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 55(04), pages 761-799, September.
    4. Steinberg, Richard H., 2002. "In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-Based Bargaining and Outcomes in the GATT/WTO," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 56(02), pages 339-374, March.
    5. Eric A. Posner & Miguel F. P. de Figueiredo, 2005. "Is the International Court of Justice Biased?," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 34(2), pages 599-630, June.
    6. Marc L. Busch, 2000. "Democracy, Consultation, and the Paneling of Disputes under GATT," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 44(4), pages 425-446, August.
    7. Guzman, Andrew & Simmons, Beth A, 2002. "To Settle or Empanel? An Empirical Analysis of Litigation and Settlement at the World Trade Organization," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 31(1), pages 205-235, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Áslaug Ásgeirsdóttir & Martin Steinwand, 2015. "Dispute settlement mechanisms and maritime boundary settlements," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 119-143, June.
    2. Bradstreet Richard S., 2011. "The Impact of Globalization of Antitrust Law on Developing Countries: Harmony or Hegemony?," Asian Journal of Law and Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 2(3), pages 1-34, October.
    3. Baccini, Leonardo & Dür, Andreas & Elsig, Manfred & Milewicz, Karolina, 2011. "The design of preferential trade agreements: A new dataset in the Making," WTO Staff Working Papers ERSD-2011-10, World Trade Organization (WTO), Economic Research and Statistics Division.
    4. Todd Allee & Manfred Elsig, 2016. "Why do some international institutions contain strong dispute settlement provisions? New evidence from preferential trade agreements," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 89-120, March.
    5. Waśniewski, Krzysztof, 2014. "Investor-state disputes and the TTIP – is it a new challenge for corporate responsibility?," MPRA Paper 57346, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Eric Neumayer & Peter Nunnenkamp & Martin Roy, 2016. "Are stricter investment rules contagious? Host country competition for foreign direct investment through international agreements," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer;Institut für Weltwirtschaft (Kiel Institute for the World Economy), vol. 152(1), pages 177-213, February.
    7. repec:cog:poango:v:5:y:2017:i:2:p:79-92 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Barbara Koremenos, 2013. "What’s left out and why? Informal provisions in formal international law," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 8(2), pages 137-162, June.
    9. Christina Davis, 2015. "The political logic of dispute settlement: Introduction to the special issue," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 107-117, June.
    10. Todd Allee & Manfred Elsig, 2016. "Why do some international institutions contain strong dispute settlement provisions? New evidence from preferential trade agreements," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 89-120, March.
    11. Karen J. Alter, 2016. "William Phelen. 2015. In place of inter-state retaliation: The European Union’s rejection of WTO-style trade sanctions (Oxford: Oxford University Press)," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 145-149, March.
    12. Karen Alter, 2016. "William Phelen. 2015. In place of inter-state retaliation: The European Union’s rejection of WTO-style trade sanctions (Oxford: Oxford University Press)," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 145-149, March.
    13. Bernard M. Hoekman & Petros C. Mavroidis, 2013. "WTO 'à la carte' or WTO 'menu du jour'? Assessing the case for Plurilateral Agreements," RSCAS Working Papers 2013/58, European University Institute.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ucp:jlstud:v:36:y:2007:p:189-212. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Journals Division). General contact details of provider: http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JLS/ .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.