If Only Half of International Agreements Have Dispute Resolution Provisions, Which Half Needs Explaining?
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DOI: 10.1086/509275
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References listed on IDEAS
- Steinberg, Richard H., 2002. "In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-Based Bargaining and Outcomes in the GATT/WTO," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 56(02), pages 339-374, March.
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- Abbott, Kenneth W. & Keohane, Robert O. & Moravcsik, Andrew & Slaughter, Anne-Marie & Snidal, Duncan, 2000. "The Concept of Legalization," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 54(03), pages 401-419, June.
- Schwartz, Warren F & Sykes, Alan O, 2002. "The Economic Structure of Renegotiation and Dispute Resolution in the World Trade Organization," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 31(1), pages 179-204, January.
- Koremenos, Barbara & Lipson, Charles & Snidal, Duncan, 2001. "The Rational Design of International Institutions," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 55(04), pages 761-799, September.
- Marc L. Busch, 2000. "Democracy, Consultation, and the Paneling of Disputes under GATT," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 44(4), pages 425-446, August.
Citations
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Cited by:
- Eric Neumayer & Peter Nunnenkamp & Martin Roy, 2016.
"Are stricter investment rules contagious? Host country competition for foreign direct investment through international agreements,"
Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv),
Springer;Institut für Weltwirtschaft (Kiel Institute for the World Economy), vol. 152(1), pages 177-213, February.
- Eric Neumayer & Peter Nunnenkamp & Martin Roy, 2016. "Are stricter investment rules contagious? Host country competition for foreign direct investment through international agreements," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer;Institut für Weltwirtschaft (Kiel Institute for the World Economy), vol. 152(1), pages 177-213, February.
- Neumayer, Eric & Nunnenkamp, Peter & Roy, Martin, 2014. "Are stricter investment rules contagious? Host country competition for foreign direct investment through international agreements," WTO Staff Working Papers ERSD-2014-04, World Trade Organization (WTO), Economic Research and Statistics Division.
- Neumayer, Eric & Nunnenkamp, Peter & Roy, Martin, 2016. "Are stricter investment rules contagious?: host country competition for foreign direct investment through international agreements," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 64175, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Neumayer, Eric & Nunnenkamp, Peter & Roy, Martin, 2014. "Are stricter investment rules contagious? Host country competition for foreign direct investment through international agreements," Kiel Working Papers 1910, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW).
- Karen J. Alter, 2016. "William Phelen. 2015. In place of inter-state retaliation: The European Union’s rejection of WTO-style trade sanctions (Oxford: Oxford University Press)," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 145-149, March.
- Áslaug Ásgeirsdóttir & Martin Steinwand, 2015. "Dispute settlement mechanisms and maritime boundary settlements," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 119-143, June.
- Barbara Koremenos, 2013. "What’s left out and why? Informal provisions in formal international law," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 8(2), pages 137-162, June.
- Christina Davis, 2015. "The political logic of dispute settlement: Introduction to the special issue," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 107-117, June.
- Bradstreet Richard S., 2011. "The Impact of Globalization of Antitrust Law on Developing Countries: Harmony or Hegemony?," Asian Journal of Law and Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 2(3), pages 1-34, October.
- Baccini, Leonardo & Dür, Andreas & Elsig, Manfred & Milewicz, Karolina, 2011. "The design of preferential trade agreements: A new dataset in the Making," WTO Staff Working Papers ERSD-2011-10, World Trade Organization (WTO), Economic Research and Statistics Division.
- Todd Allee & Manfred Elsig, 2016. "Why do some international institutions contain strong dispute settlement provisions? New evidence from preferential trade agreements," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 89-120, March.
- Waśniewski, Krzysztof, 2014. "Investor-state disputes and the TTIP – is it a new challenge for corporate responsibility?," MPRA Paper 57346, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- repec:cog:poango:v:5:y:2017:i:2:p:79-92 is not listed on IDEAS
- Bernard M. Hoekman & Petros C. Mavroidis, 2013. "WTO 'à la carte' or WTO 'menu du jour'? Assessing the case for Plurilateral Agreements," RSCAS Working Papers 2013/58, European University Institute.
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