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Democracy, Consultation, and the Paneling of Disputes under GATT

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  • Marc L. Busch

    (Queen's School of Business)

Abstract

Studies of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) stress the role of formal panels in adjudicating trade conflicts. Yet most cases are settled beforehand in informal consultations. This article tests two sets of hypotheses about the decision to escalate GATT cases, one concerning the significance of the right to a panel, the other concerning the effects of political regime type. Results show that the right to a panel did not inspire more early settlement, more escalation, or more resolution through concessions at the panel stage; however, highly democratic dyads are more likely to achieve concession, but only at the consultation stage. This suggests that a strategy of tying hands, rather than adherence to legal (and other) norms of conflict resolution, is likely to shed light on the way democracies use formal third-party adjudication at GATT.

Suggested Citation

  • Marc L. Busch, 2000. "Democracy, Consultation, and the Paneling of Disputes under GATT," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 44(4), pages 425-446, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:44:y:2000:i:4:p:425-446
    DOI: 10.1177/0022002700044004002
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    2. Roy, Martin, 2010. "Endowments, power, and democracy: Political economy of multilateral commitments on trade in services," WTO Staff Working Papers ERSD-2010-11, World Trade Organization (WTO), Economic Research and Statistics Division.
    3. J. Bradford Jensen & Dennis P. Quinn & Stephen Weymouth, 2014. "The Influences Of Foreign Direct Investments, Intrafirm Trading, And Currency Undervaluation On U.S. Firm Trade Disputes," Working Papers 14-04, Center for Economic Studies, U.S. Census Bureau.
    4. Maggi, Giovanni & Staiger, Robert W., 2020. "Learning by ruling and trade disputes," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 126(C).
    5. Bernauer, Thomas & Spilker, Gabriele, 2010. "Escalation dynamics in WTO disputes over environment, health and safety issues," Papers 89, World Trade Institute.
    6. Bernauer, Thomas & Sattler, Thomas, 2010. "Gravitation or Discrimination? Determinants of Litigation in the World Trade Organization," Papers 116, World Trade Institute.
    7. Lee, Jiwon & Wittgenstein, Teresa, 2017. "Weak vs. Strong Ties: Explaining Early Settlement in WTO Disputes," ILE Working Paper Series 7, University of Hamburg, Institute of Law and Economics.
    8. Barbara Koremenos, 2007. "If Only Half of International Agreements Have Dispute Resolution Provisions, Which Half Needs Explaining?," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 36(1), pages 189-212, January.
    9. B. Peter Rosendorff & Alastair Smith, 2018. "Domestic political determinants of the onset of WTO disputes," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 13(2), pages 243-272, June.

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