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Theoretical Perspectives of Corporate Governance

Author

Listed:
  • Ghulam Abid

    (PhD Scholar, National College of Business Administration & Economics)

  • Binish Khan

    (PhD Scholar, National College of Business Administration & Economics)

  • Zeeshan Rafiq

    (MPhil, National College of Business Administration & Economics)

  • Alia Ahmed

    (Assistant Professor, National College of Business Administration & Economics)

Abstract

Corporate Governance is relatively new area and its development has been affected by different theories from different domain, including law, economics, finance and management. This article gives a theoretical overview within the disciplines of corporate governance. This research paper provides an overview of main theory i.e., agency theory as well as other theories like stewardship theory, stakeholder theory, resource dependency theory and transaction cost economics theory that influences the development of corporate governance. Researchers also reveal the differences among these theories, spanning over different disciplines with diverge scope. Some theories are most appropriate are relevant for some context as compared to the others. The study calls the need for the development of a general theory of corporate governance with conjunction of legal system (common law or civil law) and considering other actors. It gives new mode of thinking and new direction of research in analysing corporate governance.

Suggested Citation

  • Ghulam Abid & Binish Khan & Zeeshan Rafiq & Alia Ahmed, 2014. "Theoretical Perspectives of Corporate Governance," Bulletin of Business and Economics (BBE), Research Foundation for Humanity (RFH), vol. 3(4), pages 166-175, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:rfh:bbejor:v:3:y:2014:i:4:p:166-175
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    4. Elzbieta Izabela Szczepankiewicz & Joanna Blazynska & Beata Zaleska, 2021. "Comply or Explain Principle in the Context of Corporate Governance in Companies Listed at the Warsaw Stock Exchange," European Research Studies Journal, European Research Studies Journal, vol. 0(Special 1), pages 281-310.
    5. Safina Riaz & Muhammad Ahmed Hussain Khan & Mahrow Shaheen, 2017. "Relationship Between Board Size And Firm Performance: Intervening Role Of Policies," Bulletin of Business and Economics (BBE), Research Foundation for Humanity (RFH), vol. 6(3), pages 130-140, September.
    6. Ezekiel Aremu Adewole & James Sunday Kahinde, PhD, 2023. "A Comparative Analysis of Corporate Governance Attributes and Audit Quality," International Journal of Research and Innovation in Social Science, International Journal of Research and Innovation in Social Science (IJRISS), vol. 7(10), pages 909-918, October.

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