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Does the New Economy Need New Governance? Ownership, Knowledge and Performance

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  • Audretsch, David B
  • Lehmann, Erik

Abstract

We study the implications of ownership and its induced incentives on firm performance in the ‘New Economy’. Instead of traditional performance we use firm survival on the stock market as the performance indicator. Using a unique data set of all 341 firms listed on the Neuer Markt, the German counterpart of the NASDAQ, our results differ from studies on more traditional firms. Ownership by CEOs has no influence on firm survival when introducing measurements of human capital and intellectual property rights. This confirms assumptions that firms in the ‘New Economy’ differ also in their governance structure from traditional firms.

Suggested Citation

  • Audretsch, David B & Lehmann, Erik, 2002. "Does the New Economy Need New Governance? Ownership, Knowledge and Performance," CEPR Discussion Papers 3626, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3626
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    Cited by:

    1. Tykvová, Tereza & Walz, Uwe, 2004. "Are IPOs of Different VCs Different?," ZEW Discussion Papers 04-32, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    2. Irena Grosfeld, 2006. "Ownership concentration & firm performance: Evidence from an emerging market," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series wp834, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
    3. Audretsch, David B & Lehmann, Erik E & Warning, Susanne, 2003. "University Spillovers: Strategic Location and New Firm Performance," CEPR Discussion Papers 3837, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Grosfeld, Irena, 2009. "Large shareholders and firm value: Are high-tech firms different?," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 259-277, September.
    5. Irena Grosfeld, 2009. "Large shareholders and firm value: Are high-tech firms different?," PSE Working Papers halshs-00587856, HAL.
    6. Tykvova, Tereza & Walz, Uwe, 2007. "How important is participation of different venture capitalists in German IPOs?," Global Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 350-378, March.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    corporate governance; entrepreneurship; firm survival; new economy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C14 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General - - - Semiparametric and Nonparametric Methods: General
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
    • M13 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - New Firms; Startups

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