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Ownership concentration and firm performance: Evidence from an emerging market

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  • Irena Grosfeld

    (PJSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris sciences et lettres - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

The initial view of the advantages of ownership concentration in joint stock companies was determined by the concern about the opportunistic managerial behavior. The growing importance of knowledge and human capital in the operation of firms shifts the focus of concern: excessive ownership concentration may stifle managerial initiative. This may be particularly true, and the results obtained in this paper support this hypothesis, in firms with high share of knowledge related activities. I explore the determinants of ownership concentration and the relationship between ownership structure and firm value in the context of a transition economy, i.e. an economy undergoing important changes in its legal and regulatory framework, in macroeconomic policy and most of all, in its property rights allocation. I focus on all non-financial companies traded on the Warsaw Stock Exchange since its inception in 1991 and up to 2003. We can observe that ownership of companies becomes more dispersed with the number of years of listing. The results reported in this paper suggest that firm adjust their ownership structure to firm specific characteristics and that firms belonging to the sector of high technology tend to have lower ownership concentration. The positive impact of ownership concentration on firm value detected in OLS regressions becomes even stronger when we control for the endogeneity of ownership.

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  • Irena Grosfeld, 2006. "Ownership concentration and firm performance: Evidence from an emerging market," Working Papers halshs-00590485, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00590485
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00590485
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    2. Cabeza-García, Laura & Gómez-Ansón, Silvia, 2011. "Post-privatisation ownership concentration: Determinants and influence on firm efficiency," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(3), pages 412-430, September.
    3. Jiang, Bing-Bing & LAURENCESON, James & Tang, Kam Ki, 2008. "Share reform and the performance of China's listed companies," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 489-501, September.
    4. Fang-Yi LO & Shih-Kuan CHIU & Pei-Wen SHIH, 2016. "Ownership Concentration, Location, and Internalization Advantage in Financial Performance," Journal for Economic Forecasting, Institute for Economic Forecasting, vol. 0(3), pages 82-93, September.
    5. Emilia Klepczarek, 2019. "Nadzór korporacyjny a efektywność kosztowa banków notowanych na GPW," Gospodarka Narodowa. The Polish Journal of Economics, Warsaw School of Economics, issue 1, pages 111-133.
    6. I.G. Okafor & Ugwuegbe S. Ugochukwu & Hillary C. Ezeaku, 2016. "The Effect of Board Interest on the Dividend Policy of Nigerian Manufacturing Sector," International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social Sciences, Human Resource Management Academic Research Society, International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social Sciences, vol. 6(8), pages 100-115, August.
    7. Bykova, Anna & Molodchik, Mariia & Shamilova, Ekaterina, 2017. "Ownership concentration, corporate governance development and firm performance in Russian listed companies," Applied Econometrics, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA), vol. 45, pages 50-74.
    8. Ahsan Akbar, 2015. "The role of corporate governance mechanism in optimizing firm performance: A conceptual model for corporate sector of Pakistan," Journal of Asian Business Strategy, Asian Economic and Social Society, vol. 5(6), pages 109-115, June.
    9. Zorica Kalezić, 2015. "Ownership Concentration and Firm Performance in Transition Economies: Evidence from Montenegro," Journal of Central Banking Theory and Practice, Central bank of Montenegro, vol. 4(3), pages 5-64.
    10. World Bank, 2009. "Good Governance in Public-Private Partnerships : A Resource Guide for Practitioners," World Bank Publications - Reports 12665, The World Bank Group.

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