The Effects of Board Composition and Direct Incentives on Firm Performance
This paper examines the relationship between top management compensation and corporate performance in public utilities. Previous researchers have argued that incentives for profitability are not needed in public utilities, since regulation provides assured profits. Earlier empirical work supports this claim. We reexamine this issue and provide several methodological improvements over prior studies. Our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that compensation packages for senior managers in public utilities are constructed to provide them with incentives to maximize stockholders' wealth.
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|Date of creation:||1991|
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