Why Are Firms With More Managerial Ownership Worth Less?
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
Other versions of this item:
- Fabisik, Kornelia & Fahlenbrach, Rüdiger & Stulz, René M. & Taillard, Jérôme P., 2021. "Why are firms with more managerial ownership worth less?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 140(3), pages 699-725.
- Kornelia Fabisik & Rüdiger Fahlenbrach & René M. Stulz & Jérôme P. Taillard, 2018. "Why are Firms with More Managerial Ownership Worth Less?," NBER Working Papers 25352, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Fabisik, Kornelia & Fahlenbrach, Rudiger & Stulz, Rene M. & Taillard, Jerome P., 2018. "Why are Firms with More Managerial Ownership Worth Less?," Working Paper Series 2018-24, Ohio State University, Charles A. Dice Center for Research in Financial Economics.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Cui, Huan-yu & Cao, Yue-qun, 2025. "Environmental justice, ethical transformation: Environmental courts and corporate ESG performance," Journal of Asian Economics, Elsevier, vol. 100(C).
- Borja Larrain & Peter Roosenboom & Giorgo Sertsios & Francisco Urzúa, 2024. "Ownership Concentration and Firm Value: New Evidence from Owner Stakes in IPOs," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 70(7), pages 4441-4464, July.
- Elżbieta Bukalska & Jakub Czerniak & Irmina Florek, 2025. "Does CEO Ownership in High-Tech Companies Affect Corporate Financial Decisions?," Central European Business Review, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2025(4), pages 81-106.
- Zeng, Huixiang & Ren, Lei & Chen, Xiaohong & Zhou, Qiong & Zhang, Tao & Cheng, Xu, 2024. "Punishment or deterrence? Environmental justice construction and corporate equity financing––Evidence from environmental courts," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 86(C).
- Irina I. Smotritskaya & Nadezhda D. Frolova, 2023. "Insider ownership and performance of Russian public companies: Econometric estimates," Upravlenets, Ural State University of Economics, vol. 14(3), pages 2-16, July.
- Florackis, Chris & Kanas, Angelos & Kostakis, Alexandros & Sainani, Sushil, 2020. "Idiosyncratic risk, risk-taking incentives and the relation between managerial ownership and firm value," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 283(2), pages 748-766.
- Wood, Steven, 2025. "Owners vs. agents: A global examination of the behavior of owner operators," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 103(C).
- Chaudhry, Neeru & Kattamuri, Rohit, 2024. "Do defined contribution plans create value for shareholders?," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 616-633.
- Chaudhry, Neeru & Gupta, Aastha, 2023. "Do derivatives benefit shareholders? Evidence from India," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 55(PB).
- Bianchi, Milo & Luomaranta, Henri, 2021. "Agency Costs in Small Firms," TSE Working Papers 21-1252, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Sep 2025.
- Henry Kimathi Mukaria, 2020. "Managerial Shareholding, Asset Utilization Efficiency and Shareholders Wealth: A Structural Equation Model Analysis," International Journal of Applied Economics, Finance and Accounting, Online Academic Press, vol. 7(1), pages 32-38.
- Li, Weiping & Li, Tingyu & Jiang, Dequan & Zhang, Xuezhi, 2024. "Bridging the information gap: How digitalization shapes stock price informativeness," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 71(C).
- Chaudhry, Neeru & Dhawan, Priya, 2025. "Does firms' commitment towards CSR influence idiosyncratic volatility? Evidence from India," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 68(C).
- Maria Boutchkova & Diego Cueto & Angelica Gonzalez, 2022. "Test power properties of within-firm estimators of ownership and board-related explanatory variables with low time variation," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 59(3), pages 1215-1269, October.
More about this item
Keywords
; ; ; ;JEL classification:
- G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
- G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CFN-2019-04-15 (Corporate Finance)
- NEP-SBM-2019-04-15 (Small Business Management)
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:chf:rpseri:rp1875. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Ridima Mittal (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/fameech.html .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.
Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/chf/rpseri/rp1875.html