Why are Firms with More Managerial Ownership Worth Less?
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- Kornelia Fabisik & Rüdiger Fahlenbrach & René M. Stulz & Jérôme P. Taillard, 2018. "Why are Firms with More Managerial Ownership Worth Less?," NBER Working Papers 25352, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Kornelia Fabisik & Rüdiger Fahlenbrach & René M. Stulz & Jérôme Taillard, 2018. "Why Are Firms With More Managerial Ownership Worth Less?," Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper Series 18-75, Swiss Finance Institute.
More about this item
- G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
- G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
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