IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/wbk/wboper/12665.html

Good Governance in Public-Private Partnerships : A Resource Guide for Practitioners

Author

Listed:
  • World Bank

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • World Bank, 2009. "Good Governance in Public-Private Partnerships : A Resource Guide for Practitioners," World Bank Publications - Reports 12665, The World Bank Group.
    • Handle: RePEc:wbk:wboper:12665
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstreams/a5438d65-e541-555f-9cb7-e4e4f0ae874d/download
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Alberto Chong & Florencio de, 2003. "The Truth about Privatization in Latin America," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm436, Yale School of Management.
    2. John S. Earle & Csaba Kucsera & Álmos Telegdy, 2005. "Ownership Concentration and Corporate Performance on the Budapest Stock Exchange: do too many cooks spoil the goulash?," Corporate Governance: An International Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(2), pages 254-264, March.
    3. Eduardo Engel & Ronald Fischer & Alexander Galetovic, 2006. "Renegotiation Without Holdup: Anticipating Spending and Infrastructure Concessions," NBER Working Papers 12399, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Alexander Pivovarsky, 2003. "Ownership Concentration and Performance in Ukraine's Privatized Enterprises," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 50(1), pages 1-2.
    5. Hong Liu & Jianjun Miao, 2006. "Managerial Preferences, Corporate Governance, and Financial Structure," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2006-020, Boston University - Department of Economics.
    6. Yossef Spiegel & Daniel F. Spulber, 1994. "The Capital Structure of a Regulated Firm," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 25(3), pages 424-440, Autumn.
    7. Philippe Marin & Ada Karina Izaguirre, 2006. "Private Participation in Water : Toward a New Generation of Projects," World Bank Publications - Reports 10725, The World Bank Group.
    8. Jean Tirole, 2006. "The Theory of Corporate Finance," Post-Print hal-00173191, HAL.
    9. repec:wbk:wbpubs:15024 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Irena Grosfeld, 2006. "Ownership concentration and firm performance: Evidence from an emerging market," Working Papers halshs-00590485, HAL.
    11. Dailami, Mansoor & Leipziger, Danny, 1998. "Infrastructure Project Finance and Capital Flows: A New Perspective," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 26(7), pages 1283-1298, July.
    12. Cecile Aubert & Jean- Jacques Laffont, 2005. "Political renegotiation of regulatory contracts," Game Theory and Information 0506002, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    13. Aivazian, V. & Booth, L. & Cleary, S., 1999. "Signaling, Dividends and Financial Structure: Implications from Cross Country Comparisons," Rotman School of Management - Finance 1, Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto.
    14. Igor Filatotchev & Tomasz Mickiewicz, 2001. "Ownership Concentration, 'Private Benefits of Control' and Debt Financing," UCL SSEES Economics and Business working paper series 4, UCL School of Slavonic and East European Studies (SSEES).
    15. Clive Harris & John Hodges & Michael Schur, 2003. "Infrastructure Projects : A Review of Canceled Private Projects," World Bank Publications - Reports 11329, The World Bank Group.
    16. Andrew Postlewaite, 2007. "Courts of Law and Unforeseen Contingencies," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 23(3), pages 662-684, October.
    17. Edlin, Aaron S & Reichelstein, Stefan, 1996. "Holdups, Standard Breach Remedies, and Optimal Investment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(3), pages 478-501, June.
    18. Gennaioli, Nicola & Rossi, Stefano, 2008. "Optimal Resolutions of Financial Distress by Contract," CEI Working Paper Series 2008-6, Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Alexander Moore & Stéphane Straub & Jean-Jacques Dethier, 2014. "Regulation, renegotiation and capital structure: theory and evidence from Latin American transport concessions," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 45(2), pages 209-232, April.
    2. David Martimort & Flavio Menezes & Myrna Wooders & ELISABETTA IOSSA & DAVID MARTIMORT, 2015. "The Simple Microeconomics of Public-Private Partnerships," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 17(1), pages 4-48, February.
    3. Alan Schwartz, 2004. "The Law and Economics of Costly Contracting," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 20(1), pages 2-31, April.
    4. Stepanov, Sergey & Suvorov, Anton, 2017. "Agency problem and ownership structure: Outside blockholder as a signal," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 87-107.
    5. Ichiro Iwasaki & Satoshi Mizobata, 2020. "Ownership Concentration and Firm Performance in European Emerging Economies: A Meta-Analysis," Emerging Markets Finance and Trade, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 56(1), pages 32-67, January.
    6. Fay, Marianne & Martimort, David & Straub, Stéphane, 2021. "Funding and financing infrastructure: The joint-use of public and private finance," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 150(C).
    7. Manuel Willington, 2013. "Hold Up Under Costly Litigation and Imperfect Courts of Law," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 29(5), pages 1023-1055, October.
    8. Joel Watson, 2007. "Contract, Mechanism Design, and Technological Detail," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 75(1), pages 55-81, January.
    9. Elisabetta Iossa & David Martimort, 2011. "The Theory of Incentives Applied to the Transport Sector," Chapters, in: André de Palma & Robin Lindsey & Emile Quinet & Roger Vickerman (ed.), A Handbook of Transport Economics, chapter 29, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    10. Guasch, J. Luis & Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Straub, Stéphane, 2008. "Renegotiation of concession contracts in Latin America: Evidence from the water and transport sectors," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 421-442, March.
    11. D'Alpaos, Chiara & Moretto, Michele & Valbonesi, Paola & Vergalli, Sergio, 2009. ""It Is Never too late": Optimal Penalty for Investment Delay in Public Procurement Contracts," Institutions and Markets Papers 54351, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
    12. Marco Percoco, 2012. "Infrastructure Investment and Growth in Developing Countries: Does the Type of Contract Matter?," Journal of Infrastructure Development, India Development Foundation, vol. 4(2), pages 139-152, December.
    13. Tsionas, Mike G. & Merikas, Andreas G. & Merika, Anna A., 2012. "Concentrated ownership and corporate performance revisited: The case of shipping," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 48(4), pages 843-852.
    14. Antonio Estache & Liam Wren-Lewis, 2008. "Towards a Theory of Regulation for Developing Countries: Following Laffont's Lead," Working Papers ECARES 2008_018, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    15. Watson, Joel & Buzard, Kristy, 2009. "Contract, Renegotiation, and Hold Up: General Results on the Technology of Trade and Investment," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt3923q7kz, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
    16. Buzard, Kristy & ,, 2012. "Contract, renegotiation, and hold up: Results on the technology of trade and investment," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 7(2), May.
    17. J. Luis Guasch & Jean-Jacques Laffont & Stephane Straub, 2003. "Renegotiation of Concession Contracts in Latin America," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 103, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
    18. repec:wbk:wbpubs:2703 is not listed on IDEAS
    19. Emilia Klepczarek, 2019. "Nadzór korporacyjny a efektywność kosztowa banków notowanych na GPW," Gospodarka Narodowa. The Polish Journal of Economics, Warsaw School of Economics, issue 1, pages 111-133.
    20. Chiara D'Alpaos & Michele Moretto & Paola Valbonesi, 2008. "Optimal penalty for investment delay in public procurement contracts," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers 0074, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno".
    21. M'hand Fares, 2009. "Specific Performance, Separability Condition and the Hold-Up Problem," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 29(3), pages 2055-2062.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wbk:wboper:12665. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Tal Ayalon The email address of this maintainer does not seem to be valid anymore. Please ask Tal Ayalon to update the entry or send us the correct address (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/dvewbus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.