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Rozsah integrovaného státního vlastnictví a vliv firemní kontroly na výkonnost českých podniků
[Extent of the Integrated State Ownership and Effect of the State Control on Performance of Czech Firms]

Author

Listed:
  • Jan Hanousek
  • Evžen Kočenda

Abstract

We analyze the extent of the integrated state control over the privatized companies in the Czech Republic during the decade of 1995-2005. During this period, the integrated potential of the state to control companies had a pyramid-like form. Even though the pyramid control was not fully utilized, the state owned the golden shares that significantly improved state ability to control companies. Our findings suggest that state control in the period under research is correlated with decreasing, or even negative performance of companies. The efficiency of the state-owned companies was much lower than that of the privately owned. The inability of state agencies to cooperate and inefficient state administration are the most probable explanations behind our findings.

Suggested Citation

  • Jan Hanousek & Evžen Kočenda, 2011. "Rozsah integrovaného státního vlastnictví a vliv firemní kontroly na výkonnost českých podniků [Extent of the Integrated State Ownership and Effect of the State Control on Performance of Czech Firm," Politická ekonomie, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2011(1), pages 82-104.
    • Handle: RePEc:prg:jnlpol:v:2011:y:2011:i:1:id:773:p:82-104
    DOI: 10.18267/j.polek.773
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    Cited by:

    1. Iwasaki, Ichiro & Kočenda, Evžen, 2017. "Are some owners better than others in Czech privatized firms? Even meta-analysis can’t make us perfectly sure," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 41(4), pages 537-568.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    privatization; corporate performance; golden share; corporate pyramid; state ownership; voting rights;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C51 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric Modeling - - - Model Construction and Estimation
    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • D24 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Production; Cost; Capital; Capital, Total Factor, and Multifactor Productivity; Capacity
    • L23 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Organization of Production
    • P26 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist and Transition Economies - - - Property Rights

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