IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Control consolidation with a threshold: An algorithm

  • Ariane Chapelle
  • Ariane Szafarz

Control tunnelling over firms can be reached through pyramids, cross-ownership, and other complex features. This phenomenon is frequent in Europe and in Asia. However, the theoretical literature has not yet converged toward a well-defined and robust measurement of integrated control that takes into account the threshold for control as applied in practice. Based on graph theory, this paper aims at filling this gap and proposes a new algorithm for evaluating the control tunnelling exerted by the firms' ultimate shareholders. Then, the paper discusses the various forms of control existing next to voting shares, like multiple voting rights, board representation and active monitoring, before suggesting ways to include them into the modelling of control.

(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

Paper provided by ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles in its series ULB Institutional Repository with number 2013/6065.

as
in new window

Length:
Date of creation: 2007
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in: I M A Journal of Management Mathematics (2007) v.18 n° 3,p.235-243
Handle: RePEc:ulb:ulbeco:2013/6065
Contact details of provider: Postal: CP135, 50, avenue F.D. Roosevelt, 1050 Bruxelles
Web page: http://difusion.ulb.ac.be

More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. T. Biebuyck & Ariane Chapelle & Ariane Szafarz, 2005. "Les leviers de contrôle des actionnaires majoritaires," DULBEA Working Papers in, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  2. Alexander Dyck & Luigi Zingales, 2002. "Private Benefits of Control: An International Comparison," NBER Working Papers 8711, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Marc Goergen, 2005. "Corporate Governance Convergence: Evidence From Takeover Regulation Reforms in Europe," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 21(2), pages 243-268, Summer.
  4. Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, 1987. "One Share/One Vote and The Market for Corporate Control," Working papers 440, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  5. Franks, Julian & Mayer, Colin & Renneboog, Luc, 2001. "Who Disciplines Management in Poorly Performing Companies?," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 10(3-4), pages 209-248, July.
  6. Marianne Bertrand & Paras Mehta & Sendhil Mullainathan, 2000. "Ferreting Out Tunneling: An Application to Indian Business Groups," NBER Working Papers 7952, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  7. Claessens, Stijn & Djankov, Simeon & Lang, Larry H. P., 2000. "The separation of ownership and control in East Asian Corporations," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(1-2), pages 81-112.
  8. Wahal, Sunil, 1996. "Pension Fund Activism and Firm Performance," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 31(01), pages 1-23, March.
  9. Bennedsen, Morten & Wolfenzon, Daniel, 2000. "The balance of power in closely held corporations," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(1-2), pages 113-139.
  10. Jensen, M.C. & Wamer, J.B., 1988. "The Distribution Of Power Among Corporate Managers, Shareholders, And Directors," Papers 88-06, Rochester, Business - Managerial Economics Research Center.
  11. Ariane Chapelle, 2001. "Corporate governance en Belgique: l'effet des pyramides," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/9933, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  12. Faccio, Mara & Lang, Larry H. P., 2002. "The ultimate ownership of Western European corporations," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(3), pages 365-395, September.
  13. Koke, Jens, 2004. "The market for corporate control in a bank-based economy: a governance device?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 53-80, January.
  14. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, 1999. "A Rent-Protection Theory of Corporate Ownership and Control," NBER Working Papers 7203, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  15. Becht, Marco & Bolton, Patrick & Roell, Ailsa, 2003. "Corporate governance and control," Handbook of the Economics of Finance, in: G.M. Constantinides & M. Harris & R. M. Stulz (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Finance, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 1, pages 1-109 Elsevier.
  16. Chapelle, Ariane & Szafarz, Ariane, 2005. "Controlling firms through the majority voting rule," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 355(2), pages 509-529.
  17. Guercio, Diane Del & Hawkins, Jennifer, 1999. "The motivation and impact of pension fund activism," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 293-340, June.
  18. John S. Earle & Csaba Kucsera & Almos Telegdy, . "Ownership Concentration and Corporate Performance on the Budapest Stock Exchange: Do Too Many Cooks Spoil the Goulash?," Upjohn Working Papers and Journal Articles jse20053, W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
  19. repec:dgr:kubcen:200563 is not listed on IDEAS
  20. repec:dgr:kubtil:2005017 is not listed on IDEAS
  21. Zingales, Luigi, 1994. "The Value of the Voting Right: A Study of the Milan Stock Exchange Experience," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 7(1), pages 125-48.
  22. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 1998. "Corporate Ownership Around the World," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1840, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  23. repec:rus:hseeco:72155 is not listed on IDEAS
  24. repec:use:tkiwps:0519 is not listed on IDEAS
  25. Goergen, M. & Martynova, M. & Renneboog, L.D.R., 2005. "Corporate Governance Convergence : Evidence from Takeover Regulation Reforms in Europe," Discussion Paper 2005-63, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  26. Flath, David, 1992. "Indirect shareholding within Japan's business groups," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 223-227, February.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ulb:ulbeco:2013/6065. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Benoit Pauwels)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.