The Banzhaf Index in Complete and Incomplete Shareholding Structures: A New Algorithm
In this global world many firms present a complex shareholding structure with indirect participation, such that it may become difficult to assess a firm’s controllers. Furthermore, if there are numerous dominant shareholders, the control can be shared between them. Determining who has the most influence often is a difficult task. To measure this influence, game theory allows modeling voting game and computing the Banzhaf index. This paper first offers a new algorithm to compute this index in all structures and suggests some modelisations of the floating shareholder. Then, our model is applied to a real case study: The French Group Lafarge. This exemplary case demonstrates how the float’s structure and hidden coalition can impact the power relationship between dominant shareholders.
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