Control in pyramidal structures
Today, the shareholding structure of companies is sometimes so complex that it can be difficult to find back their actual owners and controllers. In particular, in continental Europe and in Asia, control tunnelling appears frequently through pyramidal structure. After describing the ownership structure through a graph association, this paper analyses the voting game at stake in the race for control. It compares existing methods and algorithms to identify the owners and controllers of a firm in a pyramidal structure without cross-ownership. As a real life example, the case of the Belgian retail company, Colruyt, is used to apply these different methods and compare their results. Furthermore, it shows how the ownership structure allows to the Colruyt family to keep the control of Colruyt even if there are discordances inside the family.
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|Date of creation:||2009|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published in: Corporate Governance (Oxford) (2009) v.17 n° 1,p.77-89|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: CP135, 50, avenue F.D. Roosevelt, 1050 Bruxelles|
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