A characterization and some properties of the Banzhaf-Coleman-Dubey-Shapley sensitivity index
A sensitivity index quantifies the degree of smoothness with which it responds to fluctuations in the wishes of the members of a voting body. This paper characterizes the Banzhaf-Coleman-Dubey-Shapley sensitivity index using a set of independent axioms. Bounds on the index for a very general class of games are also derived.
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