On the structure of minimal winning coalitions in simple voting games
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Volume (Year): 34 (2010)
Issue (Month): 3 (March)
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- Barua, Rana & Chakravarty, Satya R. & Roy, Sonali & Sarka, Palash, 2007.
"A Characterization and Some Properties of the Banzhaf-Coleman-Dubey-Shapley Sensitivity Index,"
Staff General Research Papers Archive
12807, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- Barua, Rana & Chakravarty, Satya R. & Roy, Sonali & Sarkar, Palash, 2004. "A characterization and some properties of the Banzhaf-Coleman-Dubey-Shapley sensitivity index," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 31-48, October.
- Carreras, Francesc & Freixas, Josep, 1996. "Complete simple games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 139-155, October.
- J. Freixas & M.A. Puente, 1998. "Complete games with minimum," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 84(0), pages 97-109, December.
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