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Politics as A (Very) Complex System: A New Methodological Approach to Studying Fragmentation within a Council

Author

Listed:
  • Michela Chessa

    (Université Côte d'Azur, CNRS, GREDEG, France)

Abstract

The contemporary political landscape presents a complex and highly dynamic system characterized by fragile equilibria. We argue that while traditional cooperative game theory tools remain valuable, complex political processes need a more comprehensive analysis. By exploiting the natural isomorphism between simple cooperative games and hypergraph structures, we propose novel analytical frameworks for modeling and interpreting complex political scenarios. We apply hypergraph proper coloring, chromatic number analysis and a new measure of fragmentation to examine voting patterns within a council. We apply our analytical framework to the case of the United Nations Security Council. We formalize a persistent ideological division between Western and Non-Western member states, but we also reveal a certain fragmentation across years, in particular between Western states. This methodological approach offers promising insights for anticipating and interpreting future developments in complex political systems.

Suggested Citation

  • Michela Chessa, 2025. "Politics as A (Very) Complex System: A New Methodological Approach to Studying Fragmentation within a Council," GREDEG Working Papers 2025-16, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), Université Côte d'Azur, France.
    • Handle: RePEc:gre:wpaper:2025-16
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation

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