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Parallel axiomatizations of majority and unanimity

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  • Quesada, Antonio

Abstract

The relative majority rule and the unanimity rule are characterized for the case in which there are only two alternatives. The main axioms are motivated by a principle of binary representativeness: the aggregation of the preferences of n voters is the result of splitting the n voters into two groups, aggregating the preferences of the voters of each group, selecting for each group a representative that adopts the preference of the group, and finally aggregating the preferences of the two representatives. The two characterizations are shown to differ from each other in just one axiom, expressing strategyproofness (unanimity) or group strategyproofness (majority).

Suggested Citation

  • Quesada, Antonio, 2009. "Parallel axiomatizations of majority and unanimity," MPRA Paper 19401, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:19401
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Fishburn, P. C., 1983. "A new characterization of simple majority," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 31-35.
    2. Miroiu, Adrian, 2004. "Characterizing majority rule: from profiles to societies," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 85(3), pages 359-363, December.
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    7. Llamazares, Bonifacio, 2006. "The forgotten decision rules: Majority rules based on difference of votes," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 51(3), pages 311-326, May.
    8. Asan, Goksel & Sanver, M. Remzi, 2002. "Another characterization of the majority rule," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 75(3), pages 409-413, May.
    9. Xu, Yongsheng & Zhong, Zhen, 2010. "Single profile of preferences with variable societies: A characterization of simple majority rule," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 107(2), pages 119-121, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Bonifacio Llamazares, 2013. "On the structure of voting systems between two alternatives," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 17(3), pages 239-248, September.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Social welfare function; relative majority rule; unanimity rule; representativeness; axiomatic characterization; two alternatives.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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