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Responsiveness axioms and the majority rule

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  • Adrian Miroiu

    (SNSPA)

Abstract

The responsiveness property is an essential ingredient of May's (1952) famous axiomatization of the (simple) majority rule. However, it comes in more variants: May's classic property, Additive Responsiveness and Independence of Indifferent Societies. In this note it is proved that although the three properties can be used to produce very similar axiomatizations of the majority rule, they are independent of each other and not equally strong.

Suggested Citation

  • Adrian Miroiu, 2013. "Responsiveness axioms and the majority rule," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 33(1), pages 740-746.
    • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-12-00781
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    File URL: http://www.accessecon.com/Pubs/EB/2013/Volume33/EB-13-V33-I1-P71.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Woeginger, Gerhard J., 2005. "More on the majority rule: Profiles, societies, and responsiveness," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 88(1), pages 7-11, July.
    2. Antonio Quesada, 2011. "Unconcerned groups and the majority rule," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 31(2), pages 1757-1764.
    3. Miroiu, Adrian, 2004. "Characterizing majority rule: from profiles to societies," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 85(3), pages 359-363, December.
    4. Asan, Goksel & Sanver, M. Remzi, 2002. "Another characterization of the majority rule," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 75(3), pages 409-413, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. José Carlos R. Alcantud, 2020. "Simple Majorities with Voice but No Vote," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 29(5), pages 803-822, October.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    majority rule; axiomatization; responsiveness;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making

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