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Is big brother watching? Commission oversight of the national implementation of EU directives

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  • Bernard Steunenberg

    (Leiden University, The Netherlands, steunenberg@fsw.leidenuniv.nl)

Abstract

In this article I analyse the role of the European Commission in monitoring the transposition and implementation of EU Directives. The point of departure is that the Commission, like any political actor, has policy preferences that affect how it shapes its overseeing role. The Commission’s responses may vary between being ‘the guardian of the treaties’, not allowing for any changes, and a ‘silent witness’, permitting member states to set their own, deviating national policies. These different responses are consistent with empirical findings showing that the Commission is rather selective in starting infringement procedures. ‘Big brother is watching’ the member states, but this is evident only when interests clash and the Commission receives sufficient support from the European Court of Justice or the other member states.

Suggested Citation

  • Bernard Steunenberg, 2010. "Is big brother watching? Commission oversight of the national implementation of EU directives," European Union Politics, , vol. 11(3), pages 359-380, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:eeupol:v:11:y:2010:i:3:p:359-380
    DOI: 10.1177/1465116510369395
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Yaning Zhang, 2022. "Limits of Law in the Multilevel System: Explaining the European Commission's Toleration of Noncompliance Concerning Pharmaceutical Parallel Trade," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 60(4), pages 1001-1018, July.
    2. Thomas König & Bernd Luig, 2012. "Party ideology and legislative agendas: Estimating contextual policy positions for the study of EU decision-making," European Union Politics, , vol. 13(4), pages 604-625, December.
    3. Carsten Hefeker & Michael Neugart, 2016. "Policy deviations, uncertainty, and the European Court of Justice," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 42(3), pages 547-567, December.
    4. Nikitas Konstantinidis & Yannis Karagiannis, 2020. "Intrinsic vs. extrinsic incentives for reform: An informational mechanism of E(M)U conditionality," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 601-632, July.
    5. Jerome Schafer, 2014. "European Commission Officials' Policy Attitudes," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(4), pages 911-927, July.
    6. Bernard Steunenberg, 2022. "How Implementation Affects Revision: EU Decision‐Making on Changing the Posting of Workers Directive," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 60(3), pages 562-579, May.
    7. Ruud van Druenen & Pieter Zwaan & Ellen Mastenbroek, 2022. "Getting State Aid Approved by the European Commission: Explaining the Duration of Preliminary Investigations in the State Aid Notification Procedure," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 60(3), pages 545-561, May.

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