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European Policymaking: An Agency-Theoretic Analysis of the Issue

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  • Schmidtchen, Dieter
  • Steunenberg, Bernard

Abstract

In various European legal acts the Council has delegated power to the Commission to set common policy, conditional on specific procedural requirements, which are commonly known as "comitology". In this paper we analyse whether and how far these implementation procedures help to overcome a dilemma of delegation, which arises if (a) a principal and an agent have conflicting interests and (b) the principal, due to the structure of the principal-agent relationship, cannot perfectly control the agent (structure-induced agent discretion).

Suggested Citation

  • Schmidtchen, Dieter & Steunenberg, Bernard, 2002. "European Policymaking: An Agency-Theoretic Analysis of the Issue," CSLE Discussion Paper Series 2002-13, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:csledp:200213
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    European Union; comitology; principal-agent-relationship; structure-induced agent discretion;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K1 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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