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The Comitology Game: European Policymaking with Parliamentary Involvement

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  • Steunenberg, Bernard
  • Schmidtchen, Dieter

Abstract

This paper discusses institutional reforms that might strengthen the role of the European Parliament in the policymaking process of the European Union. Using simple game theory, the paper analyzes the working properties of the different implementation procedures that are known as 'comitology'. The Council of the European Union employs these procedures when it delegates some of its policymaking power to the Commission as part of Union legislation. We show how the balance of power is determined by the current comitology procedures, and how this balance would change if the role of the European Parliament were strengthened in the comitology game.

Suggested Citation

  • Steunenberg, Bernard & Schmidtchen, Dieter, 2000. "The Comitology Game: European Policymaking with Parliamentary Involvement," CSLE Discussion Paper Series 2000-05, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:csledp:200005
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    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/23063/1/2000-05_Comitology.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Crombez, Christophe, 1996. "Legislative Procedures in the European Community," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 26(2), pages 199-228, April.
    2. Moser, Peter, 1997. "A Theory of the Conditional Influence of the European Parliament in the Cooperation Procedure," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 91(3-4), pages 333-350, June.
    3. Steunenberg, Bernard & Koboldt, Christian & Schmidtchen, Dieter, 1996. "Policymaking, comitology, and the balance of power in the European Union," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 329-344, September.
    4. Steven A. Matthews, 1989. "Veto Threats: Rhetoric in a Bargaining Game," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 104(2), pages 347-369.
    5. Cooter, Robert & Drexl, Josef, 1994. "The logic of power in the emerging European constitution: Game theory and the division of powers," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(3), pages 307-326, September.
    6. Bernard Steunenberg & Dieter Schmidtchen & Christian Koboldt, 1999. "Strategic Power in the European Union," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 11(3), pages 339-366, July.
    7. Tsebelis, George, 1994. "The Power of the European Parliament as a Conditional Agenda Setter," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 88(1), pages 128-142, March.
    8. Steunenberg, Bernard, 1996. "Agent Discretion, Regulatory Policymaking, and Different Institutional Arrangements," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 86(3-4), pages 309-339, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Schmidtchen, Dieter, 2004. "Demokratiedefizit in Europa? Über Dichtung und Wahrheit in der europäischen Verfassungsdebatte," CSLE Discussion Paper Series 2004-08, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Strategic power index; comitology; balance of power;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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