IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/sae/eeupol/v12y2011i3p291-314.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Treaty reform and the Commission's appointment and policy-making role in the European Union

Author

Listed:
  • Christophe Crombez

    (Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium, and Stanford University and Hoover Institution, USA)

  • Simon Hix

    () (London School of Economics and Political Science, UK)

Abstract

This article analyses the role of the Commission in the European Union (EU). We present a game-theoretical model of two EU processes - Commission appointment and the adoption of legislation - and apply this model to the appointment of recent Commissions and their legislative programmes. Institutional reforms of the EU have led to more involvement of the European Parliament and majority voting in the Council in both processes. We find that the introduction of majority voting in the legislative process in the mid-1980s let the Commission move policy further from the status quo. Yet unanimity for appointing the Commission still allowed the member states to commit to a legislative programme that was preferred by all of them. More recently, the move to majority voting for appointing the Commission, combined with the ability of the European Parliament to amend Commission proposals, has moved the EU towards a more majoritarian political system. However, the potential policy consequences of these changes have been limited thus far because of the particular configuration of policy preferences of the governments and the European Parliament.

Suggested Citation

  • Christophe Crombez & Simon Hix, 2011. "Treaty reform and the Commission's appointment and policy-making role in the European Union," European Union Politics, , vol. 12(3), pages 291-314, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:eeupol:v:12:y:2011:i:3:p:291-314
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://eup.sagepub.com/content/12/3/291.abstract
    Download Restriction: no

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Barbara Dluhosch & Daniel Horgos & Klaus W. Zimmermann, 2016. "EU enlargement and satisfaction with democracy: a peculiar case of immiserizing growth," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 27(3), pages 273-298, September.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sae:eeupol:v:12:y:2011:i:3:p:291-314. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (SAGE Publications). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.