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A Theory of the Conditional Influence of the European Parliament in the Cooperation Procedure

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  • Moser, Peter

Abstract

The author provides a public choice-based explanation of why the European Parliament is sometimes influential in the cooperation procedure. While a conservative Parliament can use its right of rejections to block a decision effectively whenever there is no consent in the Council, a Parliament in favor of change can successfully use its amendment right in the second reading whenever the constraints have been changed unexpectedly since the adoption of the common position such as to create an amendment win set. Then, the European Parliament can choose its most preferred policy in this set which is supported by the Commission, cannot be changed by the Council and is preferred against the status quo by a qualified majority in the Council. Copyright 1997 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Suggested Citation

  • Moser, Peter, 1997. "A Theory of the Conditional Influence of the European Parliament in the Cooperation Procedure," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 91(3-4), pages 333-350, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:91:y:1997:i:3-4:p:333-50
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    Cited by:

    1. Napel,S. & Widgren,M., 2002. "Power measurement as sensitivity analysis : a unified approach," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 345, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
    2. Alexandra Böckem, 1998. "The political economy of climate policy-making in the European Union," Intereconomics: Review of European Economic Policy, Springer;German National Library of Economics;Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), vol. 33(6), pages 260-273, November.
    3. Martin Kolmar, 2002. "An Analysis of Institutional Change in the European Union with an Application to Social Policy," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 282, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    4. Schwager, Robert, 1999. "Democratisation versus accountability - should the European Parliament be given more powers?," ZEW Discussion Papers 99-45, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
    5. Goerke, Laszlo & Piazolo, Kathrin, 1998. "Decision making under the EU's Social Chapter," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 217-237, June.
    6. Mika Widgrén, 2003. "Enlargements and the Principles of Designing EU - Decision-Making Procedures," CESifo Working Paper Series 903, CESifo Group Munich.
    7. Nicola Maaser & Alexander Mayer, 2016. "Codecision in context: implications for the balance of power in the EU," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 46(1), pages 213-237, January.
    8. Steunenberg, Bernard & Schmidtchen, Dieter, 2000. "The Comitology Game: European Policymaking with Parliamentary Involvement," CSLE Discussion Paper Series 2000-05, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics.
    9. Stefan Napel & Mika Widgrén, 2002. "Strategic Power Revisited," CESifo Working Paper Series 736, CESifo Group Munich.
    10. Ansgar Belke & Barbara Schnurbein, 2012. "European monetary policy and the ECB rotation model," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 151(1), pages 289-323, April.
    11. Moser, Peter, 1999. "The impact of legislative institutions on public policy: a survey," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 1-33, March.
    12. Sara Hagemann & Bjørn Høyland, 2010. "Bicameral Politics in the European Union," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 48, pages 811-833, September.
    13. Mika Widgren, 2003. "Power in the Design of Constitutional Rules," European Economy Group Working Papers 23, European Economy Group.

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