A Theory of the Conditional Influence of the European Parliament in the Cooperation Procedure
The author provides a public choice-based explanation of why the European Parliament is sometimes influential in the cooperation procedure. While a conservative Parliament can use its right of rejections to block a decision effectively whenever there is no consent in the Council, a Parliament in favor of change can successfully use its amendment right in the second reading whenever the constraints have been changed unexpectedly since the adoption of the common position such as to create an amendment win set. Then, the European Parliament can choose its most preferred policy in this set which is supported by the Commission, cannot be changed by the Council and is preferred against the status quo by a qualified majority in the Council. Copyright 1997 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 91 (1997)
Issue (Month): 3-4 (June)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.springer.com|
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.springer.com/economics/public+finance/journal/11127/PS2|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:91:y:1997:i:3-4:p:333-50. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla)or (Rebekah McClure)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.