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The Contested Council: Conflict Dimensions of an Intergovernmental EU Institution

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  • Christina Zimmer
  • Gerald Schneider
  • Michael Dobbins

Abstract

Recent research has tried to uncover the political space in which the Council of Ministers of the European Union decides. Rather than the left‐right conflict or a cleavage between governments with national and supranational attitudes, this article shows that a redistributive dimension, decisively shapes the interactions in this most important legislative body of the European Union. In contrast to extant studies, we employ ex ante rather than ex post preference data and rely on correspondence analysis as a means to identify the underlying dimensions of contestation. The article concludes with an empirical investigation of how enlargement will affect the emerging political space within the European Union. Our quantitative analysis suggests that the gulf between net‐contributors and net‐receivers will further deepen.

Suggested Citation

  • Christina Zimmer & Gerald Schneider & Michael Dobbins, 2005. "The Contested Council: Conflict Dimensions of an Intergovernmental EU Institution," Political Studies, Political Studies Association, vol. 53(2), pages 403-422, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:polstu:v:53:y:2005:i:2:p:403-422
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9248.2005.00535.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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