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Accession and Reform of the European Union

Author

Listed:
  • Thomas König

    (German University of Administrative Sciences, Germany)

  • Thomas Bräuninger

    (University of Konstanz, Germany)

Abstract

This study examines how the institutional provisions of the Nice Treaty and the constitutional reform of the European Union (EU) will affect agricultural decision-making in the enlarged EU. Although the agricultural sector is a core EU policy domain, we have little knowledge about the effects of institutional reform following the accession of 10 relatively small and poor countries, each having a large primary sector. Based on an input–output taxation model, we identify the positions of old and new member states in the twodimensional space of EU agricultural politics. This allows us to investigate whether and how Council decision-making will change if the Nice Treaty’s provisions for qualified majority voting are replaced by those of the draft constitution of 2004. Our analysis shows that the constitution is an advance providing for more policy change but it falls behind the Laeken proposal, which would have effectively reformed EU agricultural decision-making.

Suggested Citation

  • Thomas König & Thomas Bräuninger, 2004. "Accession and Reform of the European Union," European Union Politics, , vol. 5(4), pages 419-439, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:eeupol:v:5:y:2004:i:4:p:419-439
    DOI: 10.1177/1465116504047311
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    References listed on IDEAS

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