Political economy of eastern enlargement of the European Union: Budgetary costs and reforms in voting rules
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- Oecd, 1996. "Budgeting and Policy Making," SIGMA Papers 8, OECD Publishing.
- Richard E. Baldwin & Joseph F. Francois & Richard Portes, 1997. "The costs and benefits of eastern enlargement: the impact on the EU and central Europe," Economic Policy, CEPR;CES;MSH, vol. 12(24), pages 125-176, 04.
- Karol Boudreaux & Jody Lipford, 1998. "Group Size, Group Heterogeneity, and Voting Rules: An Application of the Buchanan-Tullock Model to the European Union," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 5(2), pages 133-152, March.
- Ocde, 1996. "Budget et décisions politiques," Documents SIGMA 8, OECD Publishing.
- Widgren, Mika, 1991.
"Voting Power in the EC Decision Making and the Consequencesof two Different Enlargements,"
377, The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy.
- Widgren, Mika, 1994. "Voting power in the EC decision making and the consequences of two different enlargements," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 38(5), pages 1153-1170, May.
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