The Excess Power Puzzle of the EU Budget
It is a constant topic of debate how the European Union (EU) spends the money it collects from its member states. This paper supports the idea that the EU budget battle involves one-shot games that have persistent impacts on the budget allocations. In one way or the other, the member states are able to establish rules or contracts that restrict the budget allocation in advance. In the current status quo, France and Spain are the clearest winners of these restrictions, while Austria, Finland and Sweden, not to mention the new member states, suffer largest losses.
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- Stefan Napel & Mika Widgrén, 2004.
"The Inter-Institutional Distribution of Power in EU Codecision,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
1347, CESifo Group Munich.
- Stefan Napel & Mika Widgrén, 2006. "The Inter-Institutional Distribution of Power in EU Codecision," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 27(1), pages 129-154, August.
- Napel, Stefan & Widgren, Mika, 2004. "The Inter-institutional Distribution of Power in EU Codecision," Discussion Papers 944, The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy.
- Kauppi, Heikki & Widgrén, Mika, 2008.
"Do Benevolent Aspects Have Room in Explaining EU Budget Receipts?,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
6778, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Heikki Kauppi & Mika Widgrén, 2008. "Do Benevolent Aspects Have Room in Explaining EU Budget Receipts?," Discussion Papers 38, Aboa Centre for Economics.
- Kauppi, Heikki & Widgren, Mika, 2007. "Voting rules and budget allocation in the enlarged EU," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 693-706, September.
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- Kandogan, Yener, 2000. "Political economy of eastern enlargement of the European Union: Budgetary costs and reforms in voting rules," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 16(4), pages 685-705, November.
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