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A General Measure of Bargaining Power for Non-cooperative Games

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  • Goerlach, Joseph-Simon

    (Bocconi University)

  • Motz, Nicolas

    (Universidad Complutense de Madrid)

Abstract

Despite recent advances, no general methods for computing bargaining power in non-cooperative games exist. We propose a number of axioms such a measure should satisfy and show that they characterise a unique function. The principle underlying this measure is that the influence of a player can be assessed according to how much changes in this player's preferences affect outcomes. Considering specific classes of games, our approach nests existing measures of power. We present applications to cartel formation, the non- cooperative model of the household, and legislative bargaining.

Suggested Citation

  • Goerlach, Joseph-Simon & Motz, Nicolas, 2024. "A General Measure of Bargaining Power for Non-cooperative Games," IZA Discussion Papers 16809, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
  • Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp16809
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    bargaining power; non-cooperative games;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D01 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles

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