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Predictability and Power in Legislative Bargaining

Author

Listed:
  • S Nageeb Ali
  • B Douglas Bernheim
  • Xiaochen Fan

Abstract

The rules and procedures of legislatures often provide legislators with information bearing on the identities of upcoming proposers. For a broad class of legislative bargaining games, we establish that Markovian equilibria necessarily deliver all economic surplus to the first proposer whenever the information structure permits the legislators to rule out some minimum number of proposers one round in advance. This result holds regardless of the recognition process and even if players vary in patience and risk aversion. It raises the possibility that procedures adopted in the interest of transparency may contribute to the imbalance of political power.

Suggested Citation

  • S Nageeb Ali & B Douglas Bernheim & Xiaochen Fan, 2019. "Predictability and Power in Legislative Bargaining," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 86(2), pages 500-525.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:restud:v:86:y:2019:i:2:p:500-525.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/restud/rdy013
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    Cited by:

    1. Wagner, Alexander K. & Granic, Dura-Georg, 2017. "Tie-Breaking Power in Committees," VfS Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking 168187, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    2. Eraslan, Hülya & Merlo, Antonio, 2017. "Some unpleasant bargaining arithmetic?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 171(C), pages 293-315.
    3. Ali, S. Nageeb, 2015. "Recognition for sale," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 155(C), pages 16-29.
    4. Sethi, Ravideep & Verriest, Ewout, 2025. "Endogenous limits on veto power in dynamic bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 152(C), pages 345-370.
    5. Jan K. Brueckner & Steven G. Craig & Kangoh Lee, 2019. "Samuelson Meets Federalism: Local Production of a National Public Good," CESifo Working Paper Series 7709, CESifo.
    6. Marco Battaglini, 2021. "Coalition Formation in Legislative Bargaining," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 129(11), pages 3206-3258.
    7. S. Nageeb Ali & B. Douglas Bernheim & Alexander W. Bloedel & Silvia Console Battilana, 2022. "Who Controls the Agenda Controls the Polity," Papers 2212.01263, arXiv.org.
    8. Matthias Dahm & Amihai Glazer, 2012. "How An Agenda Setter Induces Legislators to Adopt Policies They Oppose," Economics Working Paper from Condorcet Center for political Economy at CREM-CNRS 2012-11-ccr, Condorcet Center for political Economy.
    9. Kim, Duk Gyoo & Lim, Wooyoung, 2024. "Multilateral bargaining over the division of losses," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 146(C), pages 59-76.
    10. Andrzej Baranski & Ernesto Reuben, 2023. "Competing for Proposal Rights: Theory and Experimental Evidence," Working Papers 20220085, New York University Abu Dhabi, Department of Social Science, revised Mar 2023.
    11. Kim, Duk Gyoo, 2023. "“One Bite at the apple”: Legislative bargaining without replacement," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 95(C).
    12. Dahm, Matthias & Glazer, Amihai, 2010. "Repeated Agenda Setting and the Unanimous Approval of Bad Policies," Working Papers 2072/151549, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
    13. Jon X. Eguia & Kenneth A. Shepsle, 2014. "Endogenous Assembly Rules, Senior Agenda Power, and Incumbency Advantage," Bristol Economics Discussion Papers 14/638, School of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.
    14. Daniel Diermeier & Carlo Prato & Razvan Vlaicu, 2016. "A bargaining model of endogenous procedures," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 47(4), pages 985-1012, December.
    15. Rosenthal, Howard & Zame, William R., 2022. "Sequential referenda with sophisticated voters," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 212(C).
    16. Goerlach, Joseph-Simon & Motz, Nicolas, 2024. "A General Measure of Bargaining Power for Non-Cooperative Games," CEPR Discussion Papers 18843, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    17. Berry, Kevin & Delmond, Anthony R. & Morin Chassé, Rémi & Strandholm, John C. & Shogren, Jason F., 2022. "A bargaining experiment under weak property rights, with implications for indigenous title claims," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 198(C).
    18. Dahm, Matthias & Glazer, Amihai, 2015. "A carrot and stick approach to agenda-setting," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 116(C), pages 465-480.
    19. Kim, Duk Gyoo, 2019. "Recognition without replacement in legislative bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 161-175.
    20. Ma, Zizhen, 2023. "Efficiency and surplus distribution in majoritarian reputational bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 210(C).
    21. Jan K. Brueckner & Steven G. Craig & Kangoh Lee, 2021. "Regionalism Meets Samuelson: Local Production of a National Public Good," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 88(349), pages 1-31, January.
    22. Eguia, Jon X. & Shepsle, Kenneth A., 2016. "Legislative Bargaining with Endogenous Rules," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 281, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

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