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Strategy-proof judgment aggregation

  • Franz Dietrich

    (Center for Junior Research Fellows, University of Konstanz)

  • Christian List

    (Dept. of Government, London School of Economics)

In the theory of judgment aggregation on connected propositions, an important question remains open: Which aggregation rules are manipulable and which are strategy-proof? We define manipulability and strategy- proofness in judgment aggregation, characterize all strategy-proof aggregation rules, and prove an impossibility theorem similar to the classic Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem. Among other ways to avoid the impossibility, we discuss weakening strategy-proofness itself. Comparing two prominent aggregation rules in the literature, we show that "conclusion-based voting" is strategy-proof, but generates incomplete judgments, while "premise-based voting" is only strategy-proof for "reason-oriented" individuals. Surprisingly, for "outcome-oriented" individuals, the two rules are strategically equivalent, generating identical judgments in equilibrium. Our results introduce game-theoretic considerations into judgment aggregation and have implications for debates on deliberative democracy.

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File URL: http://128.118.178.162/eps/pe/papers/0404/0404007.pdf
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Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Public Economics with number 0404007.

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Length: 31 pages
Date of creation: 18 Apr 2004
Date of revision: 25 Jul 2005
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwppe:0404007
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 31. pdf, prepared with latex
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://128.118.178.162

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  1. Franz Dietrich & Christian List, 2005. "Arrow's Theorem in Judgement Aggregation," Public Economics 0504007, EconWPA, revised 10 Sep 2005.
  2. Barbera, S. & Masso, J. & Neme, A., 1992. "Voting Under Constraints," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 200.92, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  3. List, Christian & Pettit, Philip, 2002. "Aggregating Sets of Judgments: An Impossibility Result," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 18(01), pages 89-110, April.
  4. Christian List, 2005. "The probability of inconsistencies in complex collective decisions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 24(1), pages 3-32, 05.
  5. Barbera Salvador & Gul Faruk & Stacchetti Ennio, 1993. "Generalized Median Voter Schemes and Committees," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 262-289, December.
  6. Alejandro Saporiti, 2007. "Strategy-Proofness and Single-Crossing," Wallis Working Papers WP48, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy.
  7. List, Christian, 2003. "A possibility theorem on aggregation over multiple interconnected propositions," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 1-13, February.
  8. Franz Dietrich, 2005. "Judgment aggregation in general logics," Public Economics 0505007, EconWPA.
  9. Wilson, Robert, 1975. "On the theory of aggregation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 89-99, February.
  10. Brennan, Geoffrey, 2001. "Collective coherence?," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 197-211, June.
  11. Nehring, Klaus, 2003. "Arrow's theorem as a corollary," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 80(3), pages 379-382, September.
  12. Dietrich, Franz, 2006. "Judgment aggregation: (im)possibility theorems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 126(1), pages 286-298, January.
  13. Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
  14. Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc & Zwicker, William, 1997. "Voting on Referenda: The Separability Problem and Possible Solutions," Working Papers 97-15, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  15. Baigent, Nick, 1987. "Preference Proximity and Anonymous Social Choice," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 102(1), pages 161-69, February.
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