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Strategy-Proof Judgment Aggregation

  • DIETRICH, FRANZ
  • LIST, CHRISTIAN

Which rules for aggregating judgments on logically connected propositions are manipulable and which not? In this paper, we introduce a preference-free concept of non-manipulability and contrast it with a preference-theoretic concept of strategy-proofness. We characterize all non-manipulable and all strategy-proof judgment aggregation rules and prove an impossibility theorem similar to the Gibbard--Satterthwaite theorem. We also discuss weaker forms of non-manipulability and strategy-proofness. Comparing two frequently discussed aggregation rules, we show that “conclusion-based voting” is less vulnerable to manipulation than “premise-based voting”, which is strategy-proof only for “reason-oriented” individuals. Surprisingly, for “outcome-oriented” individuals, the two rules are strategically equivalent, generating identical judgments in equilibrium. Our results introduce game-theoretic considerations into judgment aggregation and have implications for debates on deliberative democracy.

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Article provided by Cambridge University Press in its journal Economics and Philosophy.

Volume (Year): 23 (2007)
Issue (Month): 03 (November)
Pages: 269-300

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Handle: RePEc:cup:ecnphi:v:23:y:2007:i:03:p:269-300_00
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  1. List, Christian, 2003. "A possibility theorem on aggregation over multiple interconnected propositions," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 1-13, February.
  2. Barbera, S. & Masso, J. & Neme, A., 1992. "Voting Under Constraints," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 200.92, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  3. Franz Dietrich & Christian List, 2005. "Arrow’s theorem in judgment aggregation," STICERD - Political Economy and Public Policy Paper Series 13, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
  4. Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc & Zwicker, William, 1997. "Voting on Referenda: The Separability Problem and Possible Solutions," Working Papers 97-15, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  5. Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
  6. Franz Dietrich, 2005. "Judgment aggregation in general logics," Public Economics 0505007, EconWPA.
  7. Dietrich, Franz, 2006. "Judgment aggregation: (im)possibility theorems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 126(1), pages 286-298, January.
  8. List, Christian & Pettit, Philip, 2002. "Aggregating Sets of Judgments: An Impossibility Result," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 18(01), pages 89-110, April.
  9. Baigent, Nick, 1987. "Preference Proximity and Anonymous Social Choice," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 102(1), pages 161-69, February.
  10. Barbera Salvador & Gul Faruk & Stacchetti Ennio, 1993. "Generalized Median Voter Schemes and Committees," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 262-289, December.
  11. Nehring, Klaus, 2003. "Arrow's theorem as a corollary," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 80(3), pages 379-382, September.
  12. Wilson, Robert, 1975. "On the theory of aggregation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 89-99, February.
  13. Christian List, 2005. "The probability of inconsistencies in complex collective decisions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 24(1), pages 3-32, 05.
  14. Brennan, Geoffrey, 2001. "Collective coherence?," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 197-211, June.
  15. Alejandro Saporiti, 2008. "Strategy-Proofness and Single-Crossing," Wallis Working Papers WP55, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy.
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