IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/sochwe/v31y2008i1p15-39.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Judgment aggregation without full rationality

Author

Listed:
  • Franz Dietrich
  • Christian List

    ()

Abstract

Several recent results on the aggregation of judgments over logically connected propositions show that, under certain conditions, dictatorships are the only propositionwise aggregation functions generating fully rational (i.e., complete and consistent) collective judgments. A frequently mentioned route to avoid dictatorships is to allow incomplete collective judgments. We show that this route does not lead very far: we obtain oligarchies rather than dictatorships if instead of full rationality we merely require that collective judgments be deductively closed, arguably a minimal condition of rationality, compatible even with empty judgment sets. We derive several characterizations of oligarchies and provide illustrative applications to Arrowian preference aggregation and Kasher and Rubinstein''s group identification problem.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Franz Dietrich & Christian List, 2008. "Judgment aggregation without full rationality," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 31(1), pages 15-39, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:31:y:2008:i:1:p:15-39
    DOI: 10.1007/s00355-007-0260-1
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00355-007-0260-1
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Franz Dietrich, 2007. "A generalised model of judgment aggregation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 28(4), pages 529-565, June.
    2. Mongin, Philippe, 2008. "Factoring out the impossibility of logical aggregation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 141(1), pages 100-113, July.
    3. List, Christian & Pettit, Philip, 2002. "Aggregating Sets of Judgments: An Impossibility Result," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 18(01), pages 89-110, April.
    4. Dietrich, Franz & List, Christian, 2007. "Strategy-Proof Judgment Aggregation," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 23(03), pages 269-300, November.
    5. Franz Dietrich & Christian List, 2007. "Arrow’s theorem in judgment aggregation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 29(1), pages 19-33, July.
    6. Samet, Dov & Schmeidler, David, 2003. "Between liberalism and democracy," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 110(2), pages 213-233, June.
    7. Franz Dietrich & Christian List, 2007. "Judgment Aggregation By Quota Rules," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 19(4), pages 391-424, October.
    8. Rubinstein, Ariel & Fishburn, Peter C., 1986. "Algebraic aggregation theory," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 63-77, February.
    9. Wilson, Robert, 1975. "On the theory of aggregation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 89-99, February.
    10. Nehring, Klaus, 2003. "Arrow's theorem as a corollary," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 80(3), pages 379-382, September.
    11. Dietrich, Franz, 2006. "Judgment aggregation: (im)possibility theorems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 126(1), pages 286-298, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Dietrich, Franz, 2015. "Aggregation theory and the relevance of some issues to others," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 160(C), pages 463-493.
    2. Dokow, Elad & Holzman, Ron, 2010. "Aggregation of binary evaluations with abstentions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(2), pages 544-561, March.
    3. Dietrich, Franz & Mongin, Philippe, 2010. "The premiss-based approach to judgment aggregation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(2), pages 562-582, March.
    4. Bozbay, İrem & Dietrich, Franz & Peters, Hans, 2014. "Judgment aggregation in search for the truth," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 571-590.
    5. List, Christian & Polak, Ben, 2010. "Introduction to judgment aggregation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(2), pages 441-466, March.
    6. García-Bermejo, Juan Carlos, 2012. "A Pooling Approach to Judgment Aggregation," Working Papers in Economic Theory 2012/01, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid (Spain), Department of Economic Analysis (Economic Theory and Economic History).
    7. Jean-François Bonnefon, 2010. "Behavioral evidence for framing effects in the resolution of the doctrinal paradox," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 34(4), pages 631-641, April.
    8. Schoch, Daniel, 2015. "Game Form Representation for Judgement and Arrovian Aggregation," MPRA Paper 64311, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Ruth Ben-Yashar & Leif Danziger, 2014. "On the optimal composition of committees," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 43(4), pages 973-980, December.
    10. Philippe Mongin & Franz Dietrich, 2011. "An Interpretive Account of Logical Aggregation Theory," Working Papers hal-00625427, HAL.
    11. Philippe Mongin, 2012. "The doctrinal paradox, the discursive dilemma, and logical aggregation theory," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 73(3), pages 315-355, September.
    12. repec:spr:etbull:v:1:y:2013:i:1:d:10.1007_s40505-013-0004-6 is not listed on IDEAS
    13. Klaus Nehring & Clemens Puppe, 2008. "Consistent judgement aggregation: the truth-functional case," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 31(1), pages 41-57, June.
    14. Ben-Yashar, Ruth & Danziger, Leif, 2016. "The unanimity rule and extremely asymmetric committees," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 107-112.
    15. Dietrich, Franz & List, Christian, 2010. "Majority voting on restricted domains," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(2), pages 512-543, March.
    16. Franz Dietrich & Christian List, 2010. "The impossibility of unbiased judgment aggregation," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 68(3), pages 281-299, March.
    17. Duddy, Conal & Piggins, Ashley, 2013. "Many-valued judgment aggregation: Characterizing the possibility/impossibility boundary," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(2), pages 793-805.
    18. Franz Dietrich & Christian List, 2013. "Propositionwise judgment aggregation: the general case," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 40(4), pages 1067-1095, April.
    19. List, Christian, 2010. "The theory of judgment aggregation: an introductory review," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 27596, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    20. García-Bermejo, Juan Carlos, 2013. "A Non-Proposition-Wise Variant of Majority Voting for Aggregating Judgments," Working Papers in Economic Theory 2013/02, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid (Spain), Department of Economic Analysis (Economic Theory and Economic History).
    21. Herzberg, Frederik, 2010. "Judgment aggregators and Boolean algebra homomorphisms," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 132-140, January.
    22. Philippe Mongin, 2011. "Judgment aggregation," Working Papers hal-00579346, HAL.
    23. Michael Miller & Daniel Osherson, 2009. "Methods for distance-based judgment aggregation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 32(4), pages 575-601, May.
    24. repec:hal:journl:halshs-01249513 is not listed on IDEAS
    25. Dietrich, Franz, 2015. "Aggregation theory and the relevance of some issues to others," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 160(C), pages 463-493.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:31:y:2008:i:1:p:15-39. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla) or (Rebekah McClure). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.