The possibility of judgment aggregation on agendas with subjunctive implications
The new field of judgment aggregation aims to find collective judgments on logically interconnected propositions. Recent impossibility results establish limitations on the possibility to vote independently on the propositions. I show that, fortunately, the impossibility results do not apply to a wide class of realistic agendas once propositions like “if a then b” are adequately modelled, namely as subjunctive implications rather than material implications. For these agendas, consistent and complete collective judgments can be reached through appropriate quota rules (which decide propositions using acceptance thresholds). I characterise the class of these quota rules. I also prove an abstract result that characterises consistent aggregation for arbitrary agendas in a general logic.
|Date of creation:||Mar 2010|
|Publication status:||Published in Journal of Economic Theory, March, 2010, 145(2), pp. 603-638. ISSN: 1095-7235|
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