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Scoring rules for judgment aggregation

  • Dietrich, Franz

This paper studies a class of judgment aggregation rules, to be called `scoring rules' after their famous counterpart in preference aggregation theory. A scoring rule delivers the collective judgments which reach the highest total `score' across the individuals, subject to the judgments having to be rational. Depending on how we define `scores', we obtain several (old and new) solutions to the judgment aggregation problem,such as distance-based aggregation, premise- and conclusion-based aggregation, truth-tracking rules, and a Borda-type rule. Scoring rules are shown to generalize the classical scoring rules of preference aggregation theory.

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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 35657.

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Date of creation: 26 Dec 2011
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:35657
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  1. Franz Dietrich & Christian List, 2010. "Majority voting on restricted domains," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 27902, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  2. Conal Duddy & Ashley Piggins, 2012. "A measure of distance between judgment sets," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 39(4), pages 855-867, October.
  3. Bozbay, İrem & Dietrich, Franz & Peters, Hans, 2014. "Judgment aggregation in search for the truth," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 571-590.
  4. List, Christian & Pettit, Philip, 2002. "Aggregating Sets of Judgments: An Impossibility Result," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 18(01), pages 89-110, April.
  5. Franz Dietrich & Philippe Mongin, 2010. "The premiss-based approach to judgment aggregation," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 27896, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  6. Christian List, 2005. "The probability of inconsistencies in complex collective decisions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 24(1), pages 3-32, 05.
  7. Dietrich, Franz, 2010. "The possibility of judgment aggregation on agendas with subjunctive implications," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(2), pages 603-638, March.
  8. Pivato, Marcus, 2011. "Voting rules as statistical estimators," MPRA Paper 30292, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  9. Franz Dietrich & Christian List, 2005. "Judgment aggregation by quota rules," Public Economics 0501005, EconWPA.
  10. Smith, John H, 1973. "Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(6), pages 1027-41, November.
  11. Dokow, Elad & Holzman, Ron, 2010. "Aggregation of binary evaluations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(2), pages 495-511, March.
  12. Hartmann, Stephan & Pigozzi, Gabriella & Sprenger, Jan, 2010. "Reliable Methods of Judgement Aggregation," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/6413, Paris Dauphine University.
  13. Zwicker, William S., 1991. "The voters' paradox, spin, and the Borda count," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 187-227, December.
  14. Franz Dietrich, 2006. "General Representation of Epistemically Optimal Procedures," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 26(2), pages 263-283, April.
  15. Christian List, 2002. "A Model of Path-Dependence in Decisions over Multiple Propositions," Economics Papers 2002-W15, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
  16. Franz Dietrich, 2005. "Judgment aggregation in general logics," Public Economics 0505007, EconWPA.
  17. Dietrich, Franz, 2006. "Judgment aggregation: (im)possibility theorems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 126(1), pages 286-298, January.
  18. Nehring, Klaus & Pivato, Marcus & Puppe, Clemens, 2011. "Condorcet admissibility: Indeterminacy and path-dependence under majority voting on interconnected decisions," MPRA Paper 32434, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  19. Nehring, Klaus & Puppe, Clemens, 2010. "Abstract Arrowian aggregation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(2), pages 467-494, March.
  20. Peyton Young, 1995. "Optimal Voting Rules," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 9(1), pages 51-64, Winter.
  21. Pivato, Marcus, 2013. "Variable-population voting rules," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(3), pages 210-221.
  22. Wilson, Robert, 1975. "On the theory of aggregation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 89-99, February.
  23. Dokow, Elad & Holzman, Ron, 2010. "Aggregation of binary evaluations with abstentions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(2), pages 544-561, March.
  24. Nehring, Klaus & Puppe, Clemens, 2010. "Justifiable group choice," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(2), pages 583-602, March.
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