Judgment aggregation in general logics
Within social choice theory, the new field of judgment aggregation aims to merge many individual sets of judgments on logically interconnected propositions into a single collective set of judgments on these propositions. Commonly, judgment aggregation is studied using standard propositional logic, with a limited expressive power and a problematic representation of conditional statements ('if P then Q') as material conditionals. In this methodological paper, I present a generalised model, in which most realistic decision problems can be represented. The model is not restricted to a particular logic but is open to several logics, including standard propositional logic, predicate calculi, modal logics and conditional logics. To illustrate the model, I prove an impossibility theorem, which generalises earlier results.
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LSE Research Online Documents on Economics
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