Group deliberation and the transformation ofjudgments: an impossibility result
While a large social-choice-theoretic literature discusses the aggregation ofindividual judgments into collective ones, there is relatively little formalwork on the transformation of individual judgments in group deliberation. Idevelop a model of judgment transformation and prove a baselineimpossibility result: Any judgment transformation function satisfying someinitially plausible condition is the identity function, under which no opinionchange occurs. I identify escape routes from this impossibility result andargue that successful group deliberation must be 'holistic': individualscannot generally revise their judgments on a proposition based on judgmentson that proposition alone but must take other propositions into account too. Idiscuss the significance of these findings for democratic theory.
|Date of creation:||Mar 2007|
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