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Corrigendum to "A possibility theorem on aggregation over multiple interconnected propositions" [Mathematical Social Sciences 45 (2003), 1-13]

Author

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  • List, Christian

Abstract

Drawing on the so-called `doctrinal paradox`, List and Pettit (2002a) have shown that, given an unrestricted domain condition, there exists no procedure for aggregating individual sets of judgments over multiple interconnected propositions into corresponding collective ones, where the procedure satisfies some minimal conditions similar to the conditions of Arrow`s theorem. I prove that we can avoid the paradox and the associated impossibility result by introducing an appropriate domain restriction: a structure condition, called unidimensional alignment, is shown to open up a possibiity result, similar in spirit to Black`s median voter theorem (1948). Specifically, I prove that, given unidimensional alignment, propositionwise majority voting is the unique procedure for aggregating individul sets of judgments into collective ones in accordance with the above mentioned minimal conditions.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • List, Christian, 2006. "Corrigendum to "A possibility theorem on aggregation over multiple interconnected propositions" [Mathematical Social Sciences 45 (2003), 1-13]," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 109-110, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:52:y:2006:i:1:p:109-110
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Zoi Terzopoulou & Ulle Endriss, 2019. "Strategyproof judgment aggregation under partial information," Post-Print hal-04809526, HAL.
    2. List, Christian & Polak, Ben, 2010. "Introduction to judgment aggregation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(2), pages 441-466, March.
    3. Dietrich, Franz, 2016. "Judgment aggregation and agenda manipulation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 113-136.
    4. Philippe Mongin, 2012. "The doctrinal paradox, the discursive dilemma, and logical aggregation theory," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 73(3), pages 315-355, September.
    5. Dietrich, Franz & List, Christian, 2007. "Strategy-Proof Judgment Aggregation," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 23(3), pages 269-300, November.
    6. Lars J. K. Moen, 2024. "Collective agency and positive political theory," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 36(1), pages 83-98, January.
    7. Franz Dietrich, 2005. "The possibility of judgment aggregation for network agendas," Public Economics 0504002, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Laffond, G. & Laine, J., 2006. "Single-switch preferences and the Ostrogorski paradox," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 49-66, July.
    9. Philippe Mongin & Franz Dietrich, 2011. "An Interpretive Account of Logical Aggregation Theory," Working Papers hal-00579343, HAL.
    10. Franz Dietrich & Christian List, 2024. "Dynamically rational judgment aggregation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 63(3), pages 531-580, November.
    11. Pivato, Marcus, 2008. "The geometry of consistent majoritarian judgement aggregation," MPRA Paper 9608, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    12. Gilbert Laffond & Jean Lainé, 2008. "The Budget-Voting Paradox," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 64(4), pages 447-478, June.
    13. Franz Dietrich & Christian List, 2007. "Judgment Aggregation By Quota Rules," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 19(4), pages 391-424, October.
    14. Zoi Terzopoulou & Ulle Endriss, 2019. "Strategyproof judgment aggregation under partial information," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 53(3), pages 415-442, October.
    15. Osherson, Daniel & Vardi, Moshe Y., 2006. "Aggregating disparate estimates of chance," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 148-173, July.
    16. Dietrich, Franz & List, Christian, 2010. "Majority voting on restricted domains," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(2), pages 512-543, March.
    17. Franz Dietrich & Christian List, 2013. "Propositionwise judgment aggregation: the general case," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 40(4), pages 1067-1095, April.
    18. List, Christian, 2007. "Group deliberation and the transformation of judgments: an impossibility result," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 19273, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    19. Dietrich, Franz, 2015. "Aggregation theory and the relevance of some issues to others," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 160(C), pages 463-493.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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