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Collective agency and positive political theory

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  • Lars J. K. Moen

Abstract

Positive political theorists typically deny the possibility of collective agents by understanding aggregation problems to imply that groups are not rational decision-makers. This view contrasts with List and Pettit’s view that such problems actually imply the necessity of accounting for collective agents in explanations of group behaviour. In this paper, I explore these conflicting views and ask whether positive political theorists should alter their individualist analyses of groups like legislatures, political parties, and constituent assemblies. I show how we fail to appreciate the significance of strategic voting and agenda control by treating groups as agents. I, therefore, conclude that positive political theorists should cling to their individualist approach and maintain that groups are not agents.

Suggested Citation

  • Lars J. K. Moen, 2024. "Collective agency and positive political theory," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 36(1), pages 83-98, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:36:y:2024:i:1:p:83-98
    DOI: 10.1177/09516298231203158
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. List, Christian, 2004. "A Model of Path-Dependence in Decisions over Multiple Propositions," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 98(3), pages 495-513, August.
    2. Dietrich, Franz & List, Christian, 2007. "Strategy-Proof Judgment Aggregation," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 23(3), pages 269-300, November.
    3. List, Christian & Pettit, Philip, 2002. "Aggregating Sets of Judgments: An Impossibility Result," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 18(1), pages 89-110, April.
    4. Satterthwaite, Mark Allen, 1975. "Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 187-217, April.
    5. List, Christian, 2003. "A possibility theorem on aggregation over multiple interconnected propositions," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 1-13, February.
    6. Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
    7. Austen-Smith, David & Banks, Jeffrey, 1991. "Monotonicity in Electoral Systems," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 85(2), pages 531-537, June.
    8. Elizabeth Maggie Penn & John W. Patty & Sean Gailmard, 2011. "Manipulation and Single‐Peakedness: A General Result," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 55(2), pages 436-449, April.
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