The possibility of judgment aggregation for network agendas
Within social choice theory, the new field of judgment aggregation aims at reaching collective judgments on a set of logically interconnected propositions. I investigate decision problems, in which the agenda is a network, composed of atomic propositions and connection rules between them. Networks can represent various realistic decision problems, including most concrete examples given in the literature. Nevertheless, networks are unexplored so far due to problems when modelling connection rules in standard propositional logic. By extending the logic, I prove that, for any network, decision rules satisfying the common conditions always exist, in contrast to the literature's emphasis on impossibilities. I also characterise the class of such decision rules, and propose a simple way to select a decision rule.
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- Dietrich, Franz & List, Christian, 2007.
"Strategy-Proof Judgment Aggregation,"
Economics and Philosophy,
Cambridge University Press, vol. 23(03), pages 269-300, November.
- Franz Dietrich & Christian List, 2004. "Strategy-proof judgment aggregation," Public Economics 0404007, EconWPA, revised 25 Jul 2005.
- Franz Dietrich & Christian List, 2005. "Strategy-proof judgment aggregation," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 19299, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Franz Dietrich & Christian List, 2007. "Strategy-proof judgment aggregation," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 5812, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Franz Dietrich & Christian List, 2005. "Strategy-proof judgment aggregation," STICERD - Political Economy and Public Policy Paper Series 09, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.