A Pooling Approach to Judgment Aggregation
The literature has focused on a particular way of aggregating judgments: Given a set of yes or no questions or issues, the individuals’ judgments are then aggregated separately, issue by issue. Applied in this way, the majority method does not guarantee the logical consistency of the set of judgments obtained. This fact has been the focus of critiques of the majority method and similar procedures. This paper focuses on another way of aggregating judgments. The main difference is that aggregation is made en bloc on all the issues at stake. The main consequence is that the majority method applied in this way does always guarantee the logical consistency of the collective judgments. Since it satisfies a large set of attractive properties, it should provide the basis for more positive assessment if applied using the proposed pooling approach than if used separately. The paper extends the analysis to the pooling supermajority and plurality rules, with similar results.
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- Franz Dietrich & Christian List, 2007.
"Judgment Aggregation By Quota Rules,"
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, vol. 19(4), pages 391-424, October.
- Dietrich Franz & List Christian, 2006.
"Judgment aggregation without full rationality,"
032, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
- Franz Dietrich & Christian List, 2005.
"Strategy-proof judgment aggregation,"
LSE Research Online Documents on Economics
19299, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Franz Dietrich & Christian List, 2005. "Strategy-proof judgment aggregation," STICERD - Political Economy and Public Policy Paper Series 09, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
- Franz Dietrich & Christian List, 2004. "Strategy-proof judgment aggregation," Public Economics 0404007, EconWPA, revised 25 Jul 2005.
- Franz Dietrich & Christian List, 2007. "Strategy-proof judgment aggregation," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 5812, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Dietrich, Franz & List, Christian, 2010.
"Majority voting on restricted domains,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 145(2), pages 512-543, March.
- Franz Dietrich & Christian List, 2010.
"The impossibility of unbiased judgment aggregation,"
Theory and Decision,
Springer, vol. 68(3), pages 281-299, March.
- Dietrich Franz & List Christian, 2007. "The impossibility of unbiased judgment aggregation," Research Memorandum 022, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
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