Single-switch preferences and the Ostrogorski paradox
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- Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc & Zwicker, William S., 1996.
"The Paradox of Multiple Elections,"
96-09, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
- Christian List, 2005. "The probability of inconsistencies in complex collective decisions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 24(1), pages 3-32, 05.
- List, Christian & Pettit, Philip, 2002. "Aggregating Sets of Judgments: An Impossibility Result," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 18(01), pages 89-110, April.
- Laffond, Gilbert & Laine, Jean, 2000. "Representation in majority tournaments," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 35-53, January.
- Deb, Rajat & Kelsey, David, 1987. "On constructing a generalized ostrogorski paradox: Necessary and sufficient conditions," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 161-174, October.
- Hannu Nurmi, 1998. "Voting paradoxes and referenda," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 333-350.
- Marco Scarsini, 1998. "A strong paradox of multiple elections," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 15(2), pages 237-238.
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