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Triple-Consistent Social Choice and the Majority Rule

Author

Listed:
  • Gilbert Laffond

    () (Laboratoire d'Econometrie, LIRSA)

  • Jean Laine

    () (Murat Sertel Center for Advanced Economic Studies,Istanbul Bilgi University)

Abstract

We define generalized (preference) domains D as subsets of the hypercube {− 1, 1 } D , where each of the D coordinates relates to a yes-no issue. Given a finite set of n individuals, a profile assigns each individual to an element of D . We prove that the outcome of issue-wise majority voting ϕ m belongs to D at any profile where ϕ m is well-defined if and only if this is true when ϕ m is applied to any profile involving only 3 elements of D . We call this property triple-consistency. We characterize the class of anonymous issue-wise voting rules that are triple-consistent, and give several interpretations of the result, each being related to a specific collective choice problem.

Suggested Citation

  • Gilbert Laffond & Jean Laine, 2013. "Triple-Consistent Social Choice and the Majority Rule," Working Papers 201303, Murat Sertel Center for Advanced Economic Studies, Istanbul Bilgi University.
    • Handle: RePEc:msc:wpaper:201303
    as

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    File URL: http://repeck.bilgi.edu.tr/RePEc/msc/wpaper/mscenter_2013_12_TripleCons.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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