Ensuring Pareto Optimality by Referendum Voting
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Volume (Year): 27 (2006)
Issue (Month): 1 (August)
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- Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc & Zwicker, William S., 1996.
"The Paradox of Multiple Elections,"
96-09, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
- Asan, Goksel & Sanver, M. Remzi, 2002. "Another characterization of the majority rule," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 75(3), pages 409-413, May.
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