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Voting behavior in one-shot and iterative multiple referenda

Author

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  • Umberto Grandi

    (IRIT-LILaC - Logique, Interaction, Langue et Calcul - IRIT - Institut de recherche en informatique de Toulouse - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - Comue de Toulouse - Communauté d'universités et établissements de Toulouse - UT2J - Université Toulouse - Jean Jaurès - Comue de Toulouse - Communauté d'universités et établissements de Toulouse - UT3 - Université Toulouse III - Paul Sabatier - Comue de Toulouse - Communauté d'universités et établissements de Toulouse - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - Toulouse INP - Institut National Polytechnique (Toulouse) - Comue de Toulouse - Communauté d'universités et établissements de Toulouse - TMBI - Toulouse Mind & Brain Institut - UT2J - Université Toulouse - Jean Jaurès - Comue de Toulouse - Communauté d'universités et établissements de Toulouse - UT3 - Université Toulouse III - Paul Sabatier - Comue de Toulouse - Communauté d'universités et établissements de Toulouse)

  • Jérôme Lang

    (LAMSADE - Laboratoire d'analyse et modélisation de systèmes pour l'aide à la décision - Université Paris Dauphine-PSL - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Ali Ozkes

    (SKEMA Business School - SKEMA Business School, GREDEG - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion - UNS - Université Nice Sophia Antipolis (1965 - 2019) - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UniCA - Université Côte d'Azur)

  • Stéphane Airiau

    (LAMSADE - Laboratoire d'analyse et modélisation de systèmes pour l'aide à la décision - Université Paris Dauphine-PSL - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

We consider a set of voters making a collective decision via simultaneous vote on two binary issues. Voters' preferences are captured by payoffs assigned to combinations of outcomes for each issue and they can be nonseparable: a voter's preference over an issue might be dependent on the other issue. When the collective decision in this context is reached by voting on both issues at the same time, multiple election paradoxes may arise, as studied extensively in the theoretical literature. In this paper we pursue an experimental approach and investigate the impact of iterative voting, in which groups deliberate by repeating the voting process until a final outcome is reached. Our results from experiments run in the lab show that voters tend to have an optimistic rather than a pessimistic behaviour when casting a vote on a non-separable issue and that iterated voting may in fact improve the social outcome. We provide the first comprehensive empirical analysis of individual and collective behavior in the multiple referendum setting.

Suggested Citation

  • Umberto Grandi & Jérôme Lang & Ali Ozkes & Stéphane Airiau, 2022. "Voting behavior in one-shot and iterative multiple referenda," Post-Print hal-04305671, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04305671
    DOI: 10.1007/s00355-022-01436-0
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-04305671v2
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    1. Fatas, Enrique & Restrepo-Plaza, Lina & Banuri, Sheheryar, 2024. "A simple twist of fate. An experiment on election uncertainty and democratic institutions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 225(C), pages 272-289.

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