Sequential composition of voting rules in multi-issue domains
In many real-world group decision making problems, the set of alternatives is a Cartesian product of finite value domains for each of a given set of variables (or issues). Dealing with such domains leads to the following well-known dilemma: either ask the voters to vote separately on each issue, which may lead to the so-called multiple election paradoxes as soon as voters' preferences are not separable; or allow voters to express their full preferences on the set of all combinations of values, which is practically impossible as soon as the number of issues and/or the size of the domains are more than a few units. We try to reconciliate both views and find a middle way, by relaxing the extremely demanding separability restriction into this much more reasonable one: there exists a linear order on the set of issues such that for each voter, every issue is preferentially independent of given . This leads us to define a family of sequential voting rules, defined as the sequential composition of local voting rules. These rules relate to the setting of conditional preference networks (CP-nets) recently developed in the Artificial Intelligence literature. Lastly, we study in detail how these sequential rules inherit, or do not inherit, the properties of their local components.
References listed on IDEAS
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