Arrow’s theorem in judgment aggregation
In response to recent work on the aggregation of individual judgements on logically connected propositions into collective judgements, it is often asked whether judgement aggregation is a special case of Arrowian preference aggregation. We argue the opposite. After proving a general impossibility theorem, we construct an embedding of preference aggregation into judgement aggregation and prove Arrow's theorem as a corollary of our result. Although we provide a new proof of Arrow's theorem, our main aim is to identify the analogue of Arrow's theorem in judgement aggregation, to clarify the relation between judgement and preference aggregation and to illustrate the generality of the judgement aggregation model.
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- List, Christian & Pettit, Philip, 2002. "Aggregating Sets of Judgments: An Impossibility Result," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 18(01), pages 89-110, April.
- Nehring, Klaus, 2003. "Arrow's theorem as a corollary," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 80(3), pages 379-382, September.
- Dietrich, Franz, 2006. "Judgment aggregation: (im)possibility theorems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 126(1), pages 286-298, January.
- Franz Dietrich, 2007. "A generalised model of judgment aggregation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 28(4), pages 529-565, June.
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