Arrow’s theorem in judgment aggregation
In response to recent work on the aggregation of individual judgments on logicallyconnected propositions into collective judgments, it is often asked whether judgmentaggregation is a special case of Arrowian preference aggregation. We argue the op-posite. After proving a general impossibility result on judgment aggregation, weconstruct an embedding of preference aggregation into judgment aggregation andprove Arrow's theorem as a corollary of our result. Although we provide a new proofof Arrow's theorem, our main aim is to identify the analogue of Arrow's theoremin judgment aggregation, to clarify the relation between judgment and preferenceaggregation and to illustrate the generality of the judgment aggregation model.
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- List, Christian & Pettit, Philip, 2002. "Aggregating Sets of Judgments: An Impossibility Result," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 18(01), pages 89-110, April.
- Franz Dietrich, 2005.
"Judgment aggregation in general logics,"
- Nehring, Klaus, 2003. "Arrow's theorem as a corollary," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 80(3), pages 379-382, September.
- Dietrich, Franz, 2006. "Judgment aggregation: (im)possibility theorems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 126(1), pages 286-298, January.
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