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The Discursive Dilemma and Probabilistic Judgement Aggregation

  • Pivato, Marcus

Let S be a set of logically related propositions, and suppose a jury must decide the truth/falsehood of each member of S. A `judgement aggregation rule' (JAR) is a rule for combining the truth valuations on S from each juror into a collective truth valuation on S. Recent work has shown that there is no reasonable JAR which always yields a logically consistent collective truth valuation; this is referred to as the `Doctrinal Paradox' or the `Discursive Dilemma'. In this paper we will consider JARs which aggregate the subjective probability estimates of the jurors (rather than Boolean truth valuations) to produce a collective probability estimate for each proposition in S. We find that to properly aggregate these probability estimates, the JAR must also utilize information about the private information from which each juror generates her own probability estimate.

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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 8412.

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Date of creation: 23 Apr 2008
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:8412
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