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Factoring Out the Impossibility of Logical Aggregation

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  • Philippe Mongin

    (CECO - Laboratoire d'économétrie de l'École polytechnique - X - École polytechnique - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

According to a theorem recently proved in the theory of logical aggregation, any nonconstant social judgment function that satisfies independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) is dictatorial. This note shows that the strong and little plausible IIA condition can be replaced with a minimal independence assumption plus a Pareto-like condition. This new version of the impossibility theorem likens it to Arrow's and arguably enhances its paradoxical value.

Suggested Citation

  • Philippe Mongin, 2005. "Factoring Out the Impossibility of Logical Aggregation," Working Papers hal-00243010, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00243010
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00243010
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. List, Christian & Pettit, Philip, 2002. "Aggregating Sets of Judgments: An Impossibility Result," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 18(1), pages 89-110, April.
    2. Dietrich, Franz & List, Christian, 2007. "Strategy-Proof Judgment Aggregation," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 23(3), pages 269-300, November.
    3. Samuelson, Paul A, 1977. "Reaffirming the Existence of "Reasonable" Bergson-Samuelson Social Welfare Functions," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 44(173), pages 81-88, February.
    4. Wilson, Robert, 1972. "Social choice theory without the Pareto Principle," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 478-486, December.
    5. Dietrich, Franz, 2006. "Judgment aggregation: (im)possibility theorems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 126(1), pages 286-298, January.
    6. Klaus Nehring, 2005. "The (Im)Possibility of a Paretian Rational," Economics Working Papers 0068, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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