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Factoring out the impossibility of logical aggregation

  • Mongin, Philippe


According to a theorem recently proved in the theory of logical aggregation, any nonconstant social judgment function that satisfies independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) is dictatorial. The author shows that the strong and not very plausible IIA condition can be replaced with a minimal independence assumption plus a Pareto-like condition. This new version of the impossibility theorem likens it to Arrow's and arguably enhances its paradoxical value.

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Paper provided by HEC Paris in its series Les Cahiers de Recherche with number 854.

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Length: 17 pages
Date of creation: 01 Oct 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ebg:heccah:0854
Contact details of provider: Postal: HEC Paris, 78351 Jouy-en-Josas cedex, France
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  1. Franz Dietrich & Christian List, 2005. "Strategy-proof judgment aggregation," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 19299, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  2. List, Christian & Pettit, Philip, 2002. "Aggregating Sets of Judgments: An Impossibility Result," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 18(01), pages 89-110, April.
  3. Samuelson, Paul A, 1977. "Reaffirming the Existence of "Reasonable" Bergson-Samuelson Social Welfare Functions," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 44(173), pages 81-88, February.
  4. Wilson, Robert, 1972. "Social choice theory without the Pareto Principle," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 478-486, December.
  5. Klaus Nehring, 2005. "The (Im)Possibility of a Paretian Rational," Economics Working Papers 0068, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
  6. Dietrich, Franz, 2006. "Judgment aggregation: (im)possibility theorems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 126(1), pages 286-298, January.
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